surrender_of_Sheikh

Chapter Forty-Eight

SURRENDER OF SHEIKH MUJIB

The most significant happening of the night of 25 to 26 March 1971, was the surrender of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to the Pakistani army.

From all available accounts and from the writings of the seniormost Awami League leaders, it appears that Sheikh Mujib was very aware of the impending all-out attack on the people by the Pakistani army. According to Amirul Islam, Abdul Malek Ukil and others, Mujib began to seriously urge his political associates and party leaders on the 24 March to leave Dhaka.¹

On the afternoon of 24 March he spoke to many Awami League leaders separately and in brief-each for about a minute, and ordered them to leave Dhaka immediately.² It was the day when dialogue between the representatives of President Yahya and the Awami League leaders, Tajuddin Ahmed, Kamal Hossain etc., were being held at the President's House to finalize a draft proclamation.³

It was astonishing that Sheikh Mujib was advising his top party men to leave Dhaka at a moment when the Awami League negotiating team was busy `reading all the clauses and the schedules of the draft' in the expectation that the proclamation would be signed by both Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujib and announced within a day or two.⁴

From the optimism of the Awami League team on the 24th evening and Sheikh Mujib's advice to his colleagues to leave Dhaka immediately, it appears that Sheikh Mujib had inside knowledge and information about things to come. While talking to others he warned them about the dangers but did not share any specific information.

The situation turned serious the next day. General Peerzada was supposed to call either Tajuddin Ahmed or Kamal Hossain on the telephone for a joint session of the negotiating teams on the 25th, but no call was received from him by any of them. According to Kamal Hossain,

I waited for a telephone call throughout the fateful 25th. This telephone call never came. Indeed, when I finally took leave of Sheikh Mujib at about 10:30 p.m., on 25 March, Sheikh Mujib asked me whether I had received such a telephone call. I confirmed to him that I had not.⁵

It indicated a breakdown of the dialogue and its logical followup-an attack by the Pakistan government on the people of East Pakistan.

Group Captain A.K. Khondkar (Retd. Air Vice Marshal), recalling the developments of 25 March wrote to say that on the evening of 25 March he went to the Dhaka airport. There he saw that under very special security arrangements, General Yahya Khan had left Dhaka by a plane with only one or two passengers. He immediately conveyed that information to the Awami League office .⁶ The office must have informed Sheikh Mujib immediately about the departure of Yahya Khan.

Kamal Hossain and Amirul Islam saw Mujib for the last time on the 25th at around 10 p.m. when he had finished his supper. According to Amirul Islam, Mujib told them, `I have all information. The attack would begin immediately after the departure of Yahya Khan from Dhaka.’ ⁷ From this it appears that either he had at that time no information about the actual departure of Yahya Khan or that he did not want to tell others that he already knew about Yahya's departure. Since A.K. Khandkar had already informed the Awami League office in the evening about Yahya's departure, it is, very unlikely that the information was not immediately conveyed to Mujib.

On the 25th evening around 5-6 p.m. Rehman Sobhan took Mazhar Ali Khan, one time editor of the Pakistan Times published from Lahore, to the residence of Sheikh Mujib to meet him. According to Rehman,

At that time the house was besieged by journalists, who had presumably sensed that the denouement with the Pak army was close.. He greeted him warmly and emptied the room so that there were just the two of us with him. Bangabandhu told us that the army had decided to go for crackdown.⁸

So from this statement of Rehman Sobhan it seems that Sheikh MuJib had prior knowledge of the decision of the Pakistan army to go on the attack, an information which neither Tajuddin Ahmed nor Kamal Hossain had till the evening of 25 March; otherwise they would not have waited for a telephone call from General Peerzada to finalize the draft of a Proclamation.

The atmosphere on 25 March, particularly in the evening, was full of apprehension that a military action was imminent. Some of the leaders of the Awami League were seriously thinking of going underground and they wanted Sheikh Mujib to leave his residence and move to a safe shelter. Curiously, Sheikh Mujib stubbornly refused to do so though he advised others to leave Dhaka and go underground. According to Amirul Islam, he pressed Sheikh Mujib to go into hiding and Tajuddin Ahmed did the same, and repeatedly requested him to leave his house. Many others tried to persuade him, but he remained firm in his decision not to leave. Sheikh Mujib's argument was that there was no place where he could hide and moreover, if he left his house then the army would go on a house to house search attacking people in order to find him and consequently a very large number of people would be killed because of him!⁹

Both the arguments were strange because underground shelters are arranged with considerable care and security, and with proper arrangements. It is possible for one to remain hidden quite safely for a long time even, when the person is well known. Especially, if Sheikh Mujibur Rahman wanted to leave his residence and go underground the best possible arrangements could have been made for him. It is true that the Awami League was a constitutional party and it had no experience of covert politics, but to make arrangements for secret hideouts it was not necessary to have experience of underground politics.

The other point that if Sheikh Mujib left his residence, the army would descend on the people in search of him, was very queer, because Mujib himself had been saying that the army had decided to go for an all out action. This is not the kind of action in which the police swoops on political leaders and leading workers to make arrests. It is a general attack in which all kinds of people are killed and wounded indiscriminately and is a war against the populace. Mujib certainly knew that. And, as he said, the army had decided for a crackdown and it meant that it would happen irrespective of his remaining at his residence or leaving it for some other place. In fact, it was clear from what happened immediately afterwards that the object was not to arrest or kill the political leaders, including leaders of the Awami League, but was an all-out, indiscriminate, armed attack on the people to terrorize them, as well as the political activists. If they had wanted to arrest Awami League leaders before, they could easily have done so. It appears from the free movements of the Awami League leaders, on the 24 and 25 March, that they

did not take any particular precautions whatsoever against possible arrests.

All leaders of the Awami League made earnest appeals to Sheikh Mujib to leave and to go underground. But Mujib was adamant. In this connection he also said that in order to save his countrymen from an army massacre he had to remain at his residence even if that meant his own death in the hands of the army. ¹⁰

This proved to be baseless as his decision did not save the people from the ferocious armed attack. Even if he really meant what he said, it was naive for him not to realize this possibility, as his own party men and other people knew that such an attack was impending.

While describing the 25 March situation arising out of Sheikh Mujib's decision not to leave his residence, Amirul Islam wrote,

Time was running fast, possibly within a short time Pakistani army would come to the area. It was earlier decided that all would gather in a house at old Dhaka. But that decision had to be changed owing to Bangabandhu's refusal to come out of his residence. The leaders were heart broken at Bangabandhu's decision not to leave his residence. Tajuddin Ahmed sat in his house in a state of despair. In a way he left himself to his fate.¹¹

In fact, the leaders of the Awami League had no idea of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's intentions!

He was arrested by the Pakistani army on the night of 25 and 26 March. The decision to arrest him had been taken earlier while President Yahya Khan was in Dhaka. He stayed in the Dhaka Cantonment for the whole day on 23 May, in a meeting with the generals where possibly, the decision to arrest Sheikh Mujib was taken and the plans for Operation Searchlight were finalized. ¹²

The army headquarters in Dhaka took their first step on the 23rd to work out the plan for arresting Sheikh Mujib. An army officer, Major Z.A. Khan, who belonged to Major General A.O. Mitha's commando unit, posted at that time at the Comilla Cantonment, was called to Dhaka urgently on the 23rd and ordered to arrest Sheikh Mujib on the 25th and to plan the details for executing the plan. ¹³

Major Z.A. Khan, later Brigadier, wrote a book called The Way it Was in which he described the events in 1971. The story began with his journey to Dhaka Cantonment from Comilla by a C-130 plane on 23 March.

He described what happened immediately after his arrival at the Dhaka airport:

Major Bilal had been informed that I would be coming by C-130 and he was at the airport to receive me. On the way from the airport to the officers' mess he told me that he had instructions to take me to Colonel S.D. Ahmad of the Martial Law Headquarters. Since it was late in the afternoon we went to the colonel's room in the officers' mess, there the colonel told me that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Awami League leader, was to be arrested the next day or the day after and I was to make the necessary plan.

(Then) I was instructed to report to Major General Rao Farman at eleven o'clock on 24 March for formal orders to arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. I went to the general's office and he told me that Mujibur Rahman was to be arrested the following night. I heard him, saluted and started to leave when he stopped me and asked me aren't you going to hear how it is to be done? I told him that it was not customary to state how orders are to be carried out, but since he had something in mind he could tell me. He then said that I was to take one officer with me in a civilian car and arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. I said in view of the crowd around the house it could not be done with less than a company. He said that he was giving an order and it should be done the way he had ordered it. I told him that I was not taking the order and he could find some one else to do the job, and before he could say anything else I saluted and left his office.

‘I knew I was in trouble. For the rest of the day I did not go to any place where I could be contacted. I had been told that Major General A.O. Mitha was coming by a PIA flight which was scheduled to arrive at five in the evening, when the flight arrived I was waiting on the airfield, met the general and told him about the orders I had received and that in view of the crowd around the house it was not possible to drive up to the house and arrest Sheikh Mujib. The general told me to meet him at nine o'clock at the Eastern Command Headquarters.

From the office of the Colonel GS of Eastern Command, Major Khan was taken to the residence of General Hamid by Major General Mitha. There, Major Z.A. Khan continued,

At General Hamid's residence I waited in a waiting room, after about an hour I was called and Major General Mitha told me to tell General Hamid what I had told him. General Hamid heard me out and then telephoned Major General Rao Farman and told him that he was sending me to him and that he should meet all my requirements. General Hamid then told me that I was to arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and that he was to be taken alive. When I was leaving and had got to the door, General Hamid called my name and when I turned around he again called out remember he is to be taken alive and I will hold you personally responsible if he is killed.

After being instructed thus by General Hamid, Z.A. Khan then drove to Major General Farman Ali's office. There Farman Ali asked him what his requirement was. `I told him,' writes Z.A. Khan,

that I required three troop carrying vehicles and the layout of the house. He had the plan of the house with him and gave it to me and told me that the vehicles would be available. I then told him that the Japanese Consuls' residence was behind Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's house and if Sheikh Mujib crossed into the diplomat's house what were my instructions, the general told me to use my discretion.

It was 25 March.

A model of the route and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's house was made, ammunition was issued and after the evening meal Major Z.A. Khan briefed the company. The company was divided into three groups, one led by Captain Saeed, the second by Captain Humayun and the third by Major Bilal.

Captain Humayun with two men was sent to circle and observe Sheikh Mujib's house in a civilian car and in mufti. The assembly point of the three groups was the gate on the airport perimeter opening towards the MNA hostel and the route was the airfield, National Assembly Building, Mohammadpur, Dhanmondi.

At about nine o'clock Z.A. Khan reached the airfield. At about ten o'clock Captain Humayun came from reconnoitring the area around Sheikh Mujib's house and reported that road blocks were being constructed on the Mohammadpur-Dhanmondi road. To accomodate for the time in removing the road block, Major Khan advanced the beginning of the operation from midnight to eleven o'clock. So they drove out from the airfield to Mohammadpur at eleven o'clock at night.

The story went on.

At eleven on the night 25 and 26 March we drove out from the airfield on the road going from the MNA hostel to Mohammadpur. Street lights were off and buildings were dark, my jeep led with full headlight and troop carrying vehicles, which belonged to the signal corps, followed without lights. Driving at about twenty miles an hour the column turned left on the Mohammadpur-Dhanmondi road and about a quarter mile from Dhanmondi, the road was blocked with trucks and other vehicles turned on their sides... we went about two hundred yards and there was another road block, this time a number of pipes about two feet in diameter, the length of which completely blocked the road between two high walls... we went another two hundred yards and there was another road block, this time of bricks stacked about three feet high and about four feet in depth. We tried ramming the block with the troop carriers but could not clear a passage for vehicles. I then ordered Captain Saeed's group to manually clear a gap wide enough for the vehicles to pass and ordered the rest of the troops to dismount and proceed on foot.

We walked down the Mohammadpur-Dhanmondi road to the street on which Sheikh Mujib's house was located and turned right on the lane between the house and the lake. Captain Humayun's group entered the house adjacent to Sheikh Mujib's house, ran across the compound and jumped over the wall into Sheikh Mujib's house. Fire was opened, some people in the compound ran out of the gate, one man was killed. The East Pakistan police guard outside the house got into their 180 pounder tent, lifted the tent by its poles and ran into the lake. Sheikh Mujib's compound perimeter was secured, it was pitch dark, Mujib's house and the adjacent houses had no lights.

The house search party then entered the house, a guard of Sheikh Mujib was escorted out with a solider walking by his side. After going a little distance from the house the guard pulled out a`dah', a long bladed knife and attacked his escort, he did not know that he was being covered from behind and was shot but not killed. The ground floor was searched and no one was found there, the search party went upstairs, there was nobody there in the rooms that were open, one room was bolted from the inside. When I went upstairs someone said that there was some sound coming from the closed room, I told Major Bilal to have the door of the closed room broken down and went downstairs to check if Captain Saeed had arrived and if there was any sign of a crowd...

While I was instructing Captain Saeed on how to sort out the vehicles, there was a shot, then the sound of a grenade exploding followed by a burst from a sub-machine gun. I thought that someone had killed Sheikh MuJib. I ran back to the house and upstairs and there I found a very shaken Sheikh Mujib outside the door of the room that had been closed.

He then relates what happened immediately preceding this,

I later learnt that after telling Major Bilal to break down the closed door upstairs when I went to check on the vehicles, someone had fired a pistol shot into the room where Major Bilal's men were collected, luckily no one was hit. Before anyone could stop him a soldier threw a grenade into the veranda from where the pistol shot had come and followed it with a burst from his sub-machine gun. The grenade burst and the sub-machine gun fire made Sheikh Mujib call out from behind the closed room that if an assurance was given that he would not be killed he would come out. He was given an assurance and he came out of the room. When he came out Havaldar Major Khan Wazir, later Subedar, gave him a resounding slap on his face.

Major Khan then goes to relate what followed

I asked Sheikh Mujib to accompany me, he asked me if he could say goodbye to his family and I told him to go ahead. lie went into the room where the family had enclosed themselves and came out quickly and we walked to where the vehicles were. I sent a radio message to inform the Eastern Command that we had got Sheikh Mujib.

Continuing his account Major Khan wrote,

Sheikh Mujib then told me that he had forgotten his pipe. I walked back with him and he collected his pipe. By this time Sheikh Mujib was confident that we would not harm him and he told me that we had only to call him and he would have come on his own.

Sheikh Mujib was put in the middle troop carrier and they proceeded towards the cantonment. At that time Major Z.A. Khan realized that although he had been instructed to arrest Sheikh Mujib but had not been told where he was to take him and to whom he was to be handed over. So he decided to take him first to the National Assembly building and hold him there, while he went back to the Cantonment for instructions. Sheikh Mujib was taken to the National Assembly building and then up the stairs and made him to sit in the landing.

Major Khan went to the Martial Law Headquarters where Lieutenant General Tikka Khan had set up his headquarters. There he met Brigadier Ghulam Jilani Khan who had taken over as Chief of Staff of Eastern Command, and told him that he had arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He took Major Khan to Tikka Khan's office and told him to report to him.

Tikka Khan must have been informed earlier of Sheikh Mujib's arrest as he was very relaxed, expecting to be formally informed about it. It was decided to put him in the same room where he had been kept when detained in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. He was thus taken to the 14 Division officers' mess and was put in an independent single-bed room annexe and a guard was posted outside.

The next day Major General Mitha asked Major Z.A. Khan where Sheikh Mujib was confined and on hearing the location was very annoyed and said that there was a complete lack of understanding of the situation and an attempt could easily be made to rescue him from the mess. He had Sheikh Mujib moved to the third floor of a school building.

The basic reason why Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, decided to give himself up to the Pakistani army on the night of 25 March 1971, was his total failure as a leader at a point in the political development when firm and strong leadership, with a well-defined political objective and plan of action was urgently required.

This was the real dilemma of Sheikh Mujib and his party. Faced on the one hand with the uncompromising demand of the students for independence, and on the other with the threat of certain military action if such a demand was placed before the central government, the Awami League's decision-making process was paralysed and its leadership collapsed like a house of cards.

The Students' League leaders, who were clamouring for independence, had little or no understanding of what the demand fully meant. They also had no idea what would follow if the central government rejected that demand, which they were absolutely certain to do. Sheikh Mujib wanted to pursue a middle path with his bombastic talk on the 7 March on possible independence and then to pursue his non-violent, non-cooperation movement which followed. But with every passing day the temper of the students, the people at large and even Bengali men and officers in the army rose, and with that the preparations of the Pakistani army for a massive crackdown upon the people.

Sheikh Mujib seemed paralysed by events and persisted in his decision to stay in his residence, an action which was nothing short of a decision to surrender himself to the Pakistani army. Above all, it was the fear of the alternative which led him to act in the way he did.

He did not want to go into hiding because he did not know what to do, under the circumstances, while on the run. He was not capable of organizing a guerrilla war against an armed adversary and he did not have an outfit which could carry out and sustain such a struggle.

He did not want to go to India for help in launching a liberation war with the help of the Indian government of whom he was profoundly suspicious. To seek their help to promote an independence struggle and to ask them to organize such a struggle under their patronage were two different matters. The Sheikh had a great aversion for the latter.

At this point it is necessary to turn to the position of the United States of America concerning the situation in Pakistan, particularly in East Pakistan.

A long report ¹⁴ on 2 March sent to the State Department in Washington by Joseph J. Sisco, chairman NSC Inter-departmental Group for Near East and South Asia, said:

The Awami League emerged from the recent elections as more of a nationalist mass movement than a tight political organisation. As time passes, it will be hard pressed to fulfill its programme and satisfy the aspirations of impoverished masses of East Pakistan. It is likely to face defections from its own ranks and mounting opposition from radical left elements outside. The long-term outlook therefore suggests increasing radicalisation and political instability in East Pakistan.

So it was.

The same report said,

Our consistent position has been that US interests are better served by a unified Pakistan than by its separation into two independent statesWest Pakistan with a population of about 61 million and East Pakistan with about 76 million. We have concluded that an independent East Pakistan would be more vulnerable to internal instability, economic stagnation and external subversion than an East Pakistan affiliated with West Pakistan. We have also concluded that the East Pakistanis provide a moderating influence over West Pakistani hostility toward India. Finally, we have recognised that we have had no realistic alternative but support Pakistan's unity if we were to maintain satisfactory relations with the government in Islamabad.¹⁵

This was the basic US position, but even in the early part of March 1971 they did not entirely rule out the possibility that Pakistan and Bangladesh could separate by mutual agreement. They had certain contingency plans for such an eventuality.

On 15 March 1971, Joseph J. Sisco sent another confidential report to the State Department in Washington DC¹⁶ which said,

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced in Dhaka early today, that his party, the Awami League, was taking over the administration of East Pakistan on the grounds that the party had a majority (288 of 300) in the Provincial Assembly. Mujib acted unilaterally and in defiance of President Yahya Khan's Martial Law administration which continues to be the Government of Pakistan. The fact that Mujib's announcement contained 35 ‘directives' for assuming control of the administration indicates that it was a deliberate and carefully planned move.

In taking this step Mujib has directly confronted the Yahya government but has carefully avoided an unqualified declaration of East Pakistan independence and has based his action on the `democratic' voice of the people as expressed in the December election.

And then,

If Yahya, or others in the military, decide to resist Mujib's action by force, East Pakistan will be engulfed in a struggle between the military and the Bengali nationalists, the outcome of which can only be eventual independence of Bengal and breaking of all ties with West Pakistanunless, as seems unlikely in the long run, the army can successfully contain a rebellion. Mujib's statement called on Bengalis to resist `by all possible means' any force used against them.

This was on 15 March. The American Papers: Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Papers, 1965-1973 (edited by Roedad Khan, UPL, Dhaka, 1999), which contained regular despatches from Islamabad, Dhaka, New Delhi, Calcutta, and elsewhere, do not contain any report between 15 to 29 March, the most crucial period of all! It obviously means that the despatches covering this time contain matter which is still unpublishable, even after twenty-eight years. Interestingly, it was the same period when the US ambassador Farland was in Dhaka as was Yahya Khan and other government and army officials and also Sheikh Mujibur Rahman with whom he must have had contacts.

The situation after the middle of March reached a state when it became apparent to many, and to the Americans, that the political crisis had reached the point of no return and civil war between the Pakistan army and people of East Pakistan could no longer be avoided. The US representatives also realized that a crackdown by the Pakistani army was imminent and under such circumstances, the US had to take a stand and they did. They decided on the side of Yahya Khan and his government but at the same time they wanted to have Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as a party interested in preserving the unity of Pakistan.

They knew Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's ambivalent position regarding independence, his differences with the pro-independence Students' League leaders, so it was quite possible that at that critical juncture they wanted to enlist Mujib's support to preserve the unity of Pakistan.

Sheikh Mujib, who wanted to dissociate himself with any move for independence and at the same time wanted maximum autonomy for East Pakistan within a federal framework, also needed help and support.

It was not a surprise if this help came from Farland, the US ambassador in Pakistan. Farland had not come to East Pakistan as a disinterested spectator. He was in contact with all who counted at that moment-President Yahya Khan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the army Generals. It was clear to him also that the dialogue between the Awami League and the government was going to break down and that the Army was set to make an attack on the Awami League and the people.

Farland knew of Sheikh Mujib's reluctance to ask for East Bengal's outright independence, and thus knew the dilemma of Sheikh Mujib. Therefore, it was obvious that Farland would encourage him to take a stand which ensured the unity of Pakistan, and thus relieve him of the responsibility of leading an armed struggle.

It was quite possible that Farland suggested that even if the Pakistani army was deployed, the situation would be quickly brought under control and the dialogue between the Awami League and the government could be resumed. So, in case he decided to stay at his residence his personal safety would be guaranteed by the US ambassador in consultation with Yahya Khan.

These are not baseless conjectures. General Hamid repeatedly gave orders to Major Z.A. Khan to capture Sheikh Mujib alive. It is quite reasonable to assume that both the US ambassador and the Pakistani army, for their own separate reasons, considered Sheikh Mujib as a valuable asset in promoting their plan for the preservation of the unity of Pakistan, or even as a loose federation.

An interesting footnote in this connection is that the Pakistani Army authorities were fully aware that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would not flee like others and that he would be conveniently at his residence waiting to be arrested. Whatever uncertainties his supporters around his house felt, what was certain was that Sheikh Mujib would remain at his Dhanmondi residence on the night of 25 March.

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NOTES

1. Abdul Malek Ukil, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 55; Amirul Islam, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 84. Back to main text

2. Amirul Islam, ibid. Back to main text

3. Kamal Hossain, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 278. Back to main text

4. Ibid. Back to main text

5. Ibid. Back to main text

6. A.K. Khondkar, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 29. Back to main text

7. Amirul Islam, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 87. Back to main text

8. Rehman Sobhan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 390. Back to main text

9. Amirul Islam, BFWD, Vol. 15, p. 85. Back to main text

10. Ibid. Back to main text