Memorandum
from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to
President Nixon/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,
Box 38, President's Daily
Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword.
Washington, December
21, 1971.
SUBJECT
Information Items
[Omitted here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]
India-Pakistan Situation: Several hours after taking over as President and
Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan, Bhutto went on the air yesterday
for a "heart-to-heart talk to my people." In an apparent bid to rally
the country around his leadership, Bhutto announced that:
-Yahya and several other senior officers had
"retired" and Lt. General Gul Hassan had been named the new Commander-in-Chief of the
Army.
-"East
Pakistan
is an inseparable and indissolvable part of Pakistan." He was, however,
prepared for talks with East Pakistani leaders within a Pakistan that could be a
"loose arrangement", but that first "Indian troops must vacate
my motherland . . . and East Pakistan."
-A new constitution will be promulgated and democracy will be restored.
Prior to the broadcast, Bhutto called in Ambassador Farland./2/ He succinctly
characterized the situation by saying: "We are in one hell of a
mess." Bhutto went on to say he sincerely trusted that the United States would do all within its
capacity to assist him with the monumental effort which lay ahead. If at all
possible, he would attempt to reconcile and reunite both wings of Pakistan within some loose
federation. Bhutto also revealed that he might soon travel to Peking, since "China had not fulfilled its
obligations to Pakistan as promised."
/2/
See Document 328.
Meanwhile,
there is still considerable public resentment about the way the war ended. In
Karachi, for example, bands of
demonstrators have been roving in and out of the major business and residential
areas setting fires and causing disruptions. Many educated Pakistanis are still
openly attacking Yahya and saying that the people
will never allow the return of a military government under any circumstances.
At the same time, even those who oppose and distrust Bhutto seem inclined to
give him a chance.
The
situation is still fluid in the East. The Indian Army seems to be gradually
restoring a minimum of law and order in Dacca and reorganizing the
administrative apparatus. The "Bangla Desh" cabinet, however, has still not arrived from
Calcutta, although there are
reports that it may proceed to Dacca by mid-week. The Bangla Desh "Prime
Minister" is quoted by Dacca Radio as saying that there is a great need
for foreign aid but that they will "not touch" any part of U.S. aid because of the
"hateful and shameful" policy that the U.S. has followed toward the
Bangla Desh "freedom
struggle."
There are
also reports that the Indians have removed the two top Pak military officials
in the East to Calcutta and are making
preparations to move all Pak POWs and civil servants to detention camps in India. What could be shaping
up is protracted bargaining between the Paks, Indians
and Bangla Desh
representatives involving repatriation of the POWs, the release of Mujib (Bhutto said nothing about him)/3/ and the transfer
of the Bengali population in West Pakistan and minority groups in the East.
/3/
See footnote 4, Document 328.
[Omitted
here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]
Source: Document 329, volume XI, South
Asia crisis 1971, Department of State.