Transcript
of Telephone Conversation between President Nixon and His Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/
/1/
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370,
Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The
President was in Key Biscayne,
K: Mr.
President.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to
P: On the
India-Pakistan thing,
K: Now, if
in the next 24 hours the Indians don't agree to a ceasefire in the West we are
in for it. Up until now it could be explained that Soviets wanted to wait until
P: Has the
proposal been put up in . . .
K: No, it
has been tabled and there will probably be a vote today. And that will be the
test.
P: Well,
they [the Soviets] will veto it.
K: Well, I
don't know. They aren't saying anything any more.
P: Then
under the circumstances, would they just continue the war?
K: There
are three possibilities: First, the British proposal carries; second,
India-Pakistan ceasefire and third, the Indians continue the war until they
smash the Pakistanis in
/2/
See Document 313.
P: The one
thing I am disappointed about, really teed off at is that you were unable to
get out that Indian cabinet meeting thing. We have got to get it out.
K: We will
do it.
P: I know
there are a lot of pro-Indian people in State and who are trying to delay this.
But I want it. We ought to be pressing the Indians every day. Now that
/3/
Ambassador Jha.
K: Yes,
Mr. President.
P:
Actually with regard to the Indian aid thing, couldn't Javits/4/ or one of the
liberals on the Hill see if they couldn't stop this
now . . .
/4/
Senator Jacob Javits (D-New York).
K: The
next thing we could do is there is $123 million in goods that is moving to
P: Goods
of what type?
K: They
have been part of the economic program. It has been paid for already. We can do
it. It has been done before.
P: If the
Indians continue the course they are on we have even got to break diplomatic
relations with them. Don't you agree, Henry?
K: I
agree. There is already a strong victory statement and an unbelievable setback
for the Chinese which is none of our business but they have certainly
humiliated them.
P: And
also let it be known they have done nothing.
K: That is
right.
P: In the
event they [omission in the source text]
K: They
gave us flat assurances there wouldn't be. If that happens we will have to
reassess our position with the Russians. We will have until Saturday morning to
see that.
P: What
are they doing?
K: I said
to Vorontsov if you don't do it at the UN, do it as a
bilateral exchange of letters.
P: And
they have not responded?
K: No, it
is a little early. They could have if they wanted to.
P: The
question is . . .
K: Well,
the question is-let's look at objectively. So they put it to us and they saw
because you acted in such a [omission in the source text] way here, we are
going to drop the summit . . .
P: Well,
dropping the summit is not the first thing I would do.
K: Well,
you have to look to see how much we are willing to pay in terms of where we are
going.
P: To keep
ourselves in perspective we have to realize the Russians have put it to us
previously in other parts of the world so we have to just grin and bear it,
right?
K: But not
you, Mr. President.
P: No, but
my point is we try everything that we can, but we have to realize the
Russians-we have to let them know our options.
K: Our
options are limited.
P: They
are limited, but even with them we can't deal with those Soviets and continue
to talk about sales and various other problems.
K: Our
options are not all that good.
P: They
are not good but they will get results. If after all these appeals and . . .
K: They
are going to continue to butter you up.
P: My view
is this: I won't let them do this. Did the Jordanians send planes.
K: 17.
P: Well,
my point is so we have done a check of these little things. Now in the event we
are going to end up by saying to the Russians you proved to be so untrustworthy
we can't deal with you on any issues. Let's use that card now.
K: We have
pretty well told them that.
P: Well,
we told them that privately, they may not believe that.
K: Well,
if they don't believe the President of the
P: You
don't understand. We threatened it. Let's do it.
K: No, for
that it is premature, Mr. President. That we cannot do because they still may
get us a ceasefire. If they don't get a ceasefire, what do we do then?
P: Cut off
the
K: That is
right. Break the White House channel.
P: And be
very cold in our public statements toward them. What I am getting at is if we
are prepared to go and have the card to play where we would not talk at all.
Another thing I would beef up the Defense Budget plans then.
K: The
Defense Budget is being worked on.
P: You
will have that done by Friday/6/ night?
/6/
December 17.
K: Yes.
P: Now,
Henry, I am not yet satisfied and I am really mad that this assistance report
is not down here. LDX it down here in two hours-Indian aid for next year and
last, how much PL-480, how much economic assistance, unilateral assistance-I
want to see it.
K: We have
got it, but we will get it down.
P: I know
the bigger game is the Russian game, but the Indians also have played us for
squares here. They have done this once and when this is over they will come to
us ask us to forgive and forget. This we must not do. If they want to be
dependent on the Russians, let them be, but when the chips are down
K: We
would, but remember you have got to realize everything is being done out of this
office. We have a bureaucratic system to deal with. I think it would be better
if State told them.
P: Call Sisco. He is to call in the Indian Ambassador and tell him
that the U.S., under the circumstances, if there is not a ceasefire we will
have no choice and all Indian assistance of all types will be taken out of the
budget and call me in an hour./7/
/7/
Kissinger called Nixon again at
K: Yes,
Mr. President.
Source: Document 314, volume XI,