Message
from the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497,
President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin
and Kissinger, Vol. 2. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the
message indicates it was delivered by Vorontsov to Haig at
The Soviet
leaders believe that further aggravation of the situation on Indian
subcontinent demands that urgent measures be taken. That is precisely how we
act trying to create a turn from war to peace in the development of events there
and to ensure just and stable settlement.
In all
this case there are many complexities. The character of the current events
demands that all circumstances should be taken into consideration in order to
make a really correct decision. That is why a calm, weighed approach is needed.
We would like to see our exchange of opinion to be conducted in such a spirit.
In your
letter of December 10/2/ you proceed from a necessity of ceasefire between
/2/
Document 269.
It also
follows from your letter that it was not without the influence on the part of
the United States that certain suggestions by General Farman
to the UN representative in Dacca have appeared on December 10,/3/ which in our
opinion lead in general to the right direction.
/3/
See footnote 3, Document 263.
We are in
constant contact with the Indian side. One of the results of these very
contacts was the message transmitted to you on December 12/4/ that
/4/
Document 284.
In the
course of consultations the Indian side has expressed the willingness to
ceasefire and withdraw its forces if Pakistani Government withdraws its forces
from East Pakistan and peaceful settlement is reached there with the lawful
representatives of East Pakistani population, to whom the power will be
transferred and conditions will be created for return from India of all East
Pakistani refugees. At the same time the Indians have no intentions to impose
their will on the East Pakistani people who themselves will determine their
fate.
Then there
is a necessary basis for an immediate cessation of the conflict and this
opportunity should be used.
We noted
with satisfaction that your letter contained an agreement with the approach of
the Soviet side to the questions of political settlement. This allows to act appropriately. We believe that it will be only a gain
if in our exchange of opinion a confidential agreement does not differ from
public positions.
It is even
more difficult for us to understand how is it possible to combine striving for
a constructive peaceful settlement of the problem by collective efforts of our
countries with such unilateral actions like demonstrative movements of naval
forces and so on. Suppose the other side will also embark on the path of taking
similar measures-what then will be the net result?
We think
that after having now reached a rapprochement of our opinions as to how to
approach the task of elimination of the conflict, it is desirable to convert
this into appropriate agreed actions. And here it is necessary first of all to
exert influence on the Pakistani Government. It would be good if the American
side on its part also stressed to the Pakistani Government the necessity of
embarking on the path towards political settlement in
We on our
part intend to continue doing all that depend on us and will continue to
maintain closest contacts with you, Mr. President, through the established
confidential channels. Now there is a basis for the solution and we must seize
this opportunity.
Source: Document 295, volume XI,