Telegram
from the Embassy in
/1/
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis.
12537.
Subject: Discussion with Pres. Yahya re
Ceasefire-Dec. 14. Ref:
/2/ See
footnotes 2 and 3, Document 296.
/3/ In telegram 12507 from
/4/ In his report to President Yahya
on December 13, Governor Malik warned that, according
to his information, the Indian army intended to kill all West Pakistanis in
1.
Summary: President Yahya acknowledges that military
situation in
2. At my
request, I met with President Yahya in his residence
at 1130 hours local, Dec. 14. The conversation ensued for an hour and 45
minutes. FonSec Sultan Khan was present during most
of the meeting.
3. I
informed President Yahya that a flash wire/5/ from my
Consul General in Dacca, Herbert A. Spivack, reported
that he had this morning received a phone call from Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik saying that he and
Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali
were prepared to submit to him (Spivak) certain
proposals for a ceasefire, saying that a ceasefire was absolutely necessary inasmuch
as the situation had become hopelessly worsened. Malik
had assured the Consul General that the proposals would carry their signatures
and would have the approval of President Yahya. I
went on to say that shortly thereafter I had received another flash message/6/
from Consul General Spivack indicating that these
proposals, according to Governor Malik, would not be
forthcoming inasmuch as "General Niazi had
stated that negotiations are taking place in Islamabad between the central
government and Ambassador Farland, and that there was
no need for me (Malik) to convey any proposals."
/5/
Reference is to telegram 5627 from
/6/
Reference is to telegram 5628 from
4. I then asked
Yahya if the GOP had had further thoughts over and
beyond our last conversation of Dec. 12 (Islamabad 12415)/7/ during which he
had informed me that, on the matter of ceasefire, he was prepared to do
"anything reasonable under the circumstances"; and raised the
question of whether or not GOP was now prepared to go beyond the UNGA
resolution.
/7/ The reference is in error; the correct citation should be to
telegram 12414 from
5. Yahya said that the situation in
6. In our
previous conversations, Yahya noted, the subject of
ceasefire had been discussed only in general terms and without reference to
specifics; however, current conditions now require USG be informed of specific
determinations of GOP. Consequently, Yahya said that,
when he received my call, he was in the process of instituting a request for me
to come to see him this morning.
7. Also,
he advised me that he had attempted to call Governor Malik
this morning but the communication system was largely inoperative and no
satisfactory conversation was concluded. He added that his call to Malik was predicated upon a communication from the Governor
which he had received yesterday and which now prompted his (Yahya's)
current evaluation and thinking. He read and then, at my request, gave me a
copy of Governor Malik's report, asking that I send
it to the Department. It is being dispatched separately by reftel
8. Because
of his now firm decision that the military situation in East Pakistan was
chaotic and irretrievable and that, for over-riding humanitarian
considerations, he had decided to give Vice Prime Minister-designate and
Foreign Minister-designate Zulfikar A. Bhutto the
widest possible latitude in his approach to the United Nations to effect a
ceasefire and troop withdrawal. Yahya went on to say
that the Foreign Office had prepared and processed a communication to him
spelling out his commission in detail. Yahya added
that Bhutto would get in touch with Ambassador Bush at the USUN and would
convey to him the substance of the reported message. At this juncture I asked Yahya if he would care to elaborate at this time upon
Bhutto's commission. Yahya replied that the
communication to Bhutto was couched in Foreign Office jargon but what it said
in brief was "do the best you can under the circumstances."
9. Yahya concluded the conversation by telling me that he
would advise Governor Malik of our meeting and of his
decision to give Bhutto widest discretion. Also, he said he would be sending
military instructions to General Niazi to continue
moderate defensive activities during present diplomatic maneuvering, but with
every effort being made to reduce loss of life.
Farland
Source: Document 301, volume XI,