Memorandum
for the Record/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492,
President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971,
Vol. 8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Haig.
Washington, December 14, 1971, 6-7 p.m.
SUBJECT
Meeting between Henry A. Kissinger, Soviet Minister Vorontsov,
and Brigadier General Haig, Tuesday,
December 14, 1971, 6:00 p.m.
Dr.
Kissinger informed Minister Vorontsov that the
President had asked him to meet with the Minister to again reiterate and expand
on some of the items that General Haig had discussed
with him earlier that day./2/ Dr. Kissinger noted that when the crisis in the
Subcontinent became acute, the U.S. Government delayed initiating unilateral
action or action in concert with other governments with the hope that the US
could work jointly with the Soviet Union in the established confidential
channel in a search for a constructive and peaceful solution to the dilemma. It
was specifically for this reason that the United States held up military moves
and other actions which it might otherwise have undertaken in its own interest
and in the interest of world peace. Despite this fact, the prolonged time that
lapsed between Mr. Vorontsov's discussions with Dr.
Kissinger on Sunday morning (December 12) and the receipt of a formal Soviet
response/3/ early Tuesday morning resulted in certain unilateral actions by the
U.S. Government. These same delays were experienced following Dr. Kissinger's
earlier discussions with Minister Vorontsov during
the outbreak of the fighting.
/2/
See Document 303.
/3/
Document 295.
Dr.
Kissinger stated that he noted with satisfaction the Soviet Government's
assurance that the Government of India had absolutely no territorial designs on
West Pakistan, and he wanted it clearly understood that he was referring to a
return to the status quo ante or the existing dividing lines between India and
West Pakistan and that efforts would not be made to modify these dividing lines
in the current crisis. Mr. Vorontsov replied that
this was precisely the Soviet view and their understanding of the assurance
provided to the United States Government; in other words, that there should be
a precise return to the status quo ante which existed prior to the current
crisis. Dr. Kissinger stated that Mr. Vorontsov may
have noted the press reports/4/ coming from Air Force One during the return of
the Presidential party from the Azores. Mr. Vorontsov indicated that he was aware of those remarks. Dr.
Kissinger stated that these remarks were somewhat overplayed by the press and
they should be interpreted as confirmation of the U.S. view that there was no
longer any justification for failing to settle the conflict on the
Subcontinent. Further delays of the kind we have been experiencing constitute a
temporary irritation in U.S./Soviet relationships and the remarks on the plane
were designed to note the U.S.'s concern. Should the
situation continue to deteriorate, it must have an impact on future U.S./Soviet
relationships. Soviet actions thus far are not consistent with the United
States Government's conception of joint U.S./
/4/ The
New York Times reported on December 15 that Kissinger told reporters that Nixon
regarded the Soviet
Union
as capable of restraining India. He added that if the
Soviets did not do so within the next few days, Nixon was prepared to reassess
the entire relationship between Washington and Moscow, including the summit
meeting that was scheduled for the following May.
Soviet
action in search of an improved environment for world peace.
Dr.
Kissinger noted that the United Kingdom now had a resolution
before the United Nations./5/ While this resolution
appeared to be changing hourly, it is in the general framework of the kind of
resolution that the U.S. believes the Soviet
Government and the U.S. Government should support. The United States Government
is not aware of the view of the People's Republic of China on this resolution, but
if all parties could get behind such a resolution then the situation on the
Subcontinent could be settled tomorrow. If this is not the Soviet Government's
view, how should the United States then interpret the
communication from the Soviet leaders? Mr. Vorontsov
asked why the United States Government would not be willing to go beyond a
resolution calling for a simple ceasefire since this was not adequate in the
Soviet or the Indian viewpoint. Dr. Kissinger stated that the resolution might
be expanded to include withdrawal since Indian forces have penetrated much
Pakistani territory. Thus far, Soviet reactions have been slow and
characterized by delaying tactics. The U.S. has observed the Soviet
bureaucracy move with the greatest speed when it chooses to do so. Minister Vorontsov stated that the complication arose when the
United States Government changed on Monday/6/ the proposals it had made the
previous week to the Soviet Government. This was a cause of great concern to
the Soviet leaders. Of particular concern was the fact that the United States
Government dropped reference to a political solution which was contained in the
language given by Dr. Kissinger to Minister Vorontsov
earlier. Dr. Kissinger stated that this was true but that the reasons that it was necessary to do so was the failure on
the part of the Soviet Government to respond promptly to the U.S. proposal. Minister Vorontsov said the problem is obviously not a question of
Soviet or U.S. ill will but one of the
complexity of the problem. Dr. Kissinger stated that
he was less concerned about the immediate handling of the situation but could
not help but blame the Soviet Union for letting the
situation develop in the first instance. For example, the provision of massive
amounts of modern military equipment to the Government of India, and threats to
China which served as a guarantee and cover for Indian action had to be
considered as the cause of the difficulty. Minister Vorontsov
replied that the Paks had U.S. armament, some Soviet
armament and some Chinese armament. The real problem was the result of grievous
errors made by Pakistan in the East. Dr.
Kissinger stated that we are now dealing with reality which must receive urgent
attention. The U.S. is prepared on its part
to give up its demand for withdrawal and it has asked that the Soviets on its
part give up its demands for a political settlement. This poses an obvious
compromise. Minister Vorontsov noted that the U.S. departure from its
earlier language is what has caused the problem. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that
this was forced on the U.S. side because the Soviet
Government gave no answer over a prolonged period. Thus, the U.S. was forced to move
based on the principles to which it adhered. There was no Soviet response even
after the President's departure for the Azores. Thus, the United States had no alternative but
to adhere to the moral principles associated with the issue. Minister Vorontsov said it should be noted that when the United States dropped the three
essential points contained in its initial proposal, Moscow was greatly disturbed.
Moscow had originally been
very pleased by the U.S. move in
Dacca which the President
noted in his letter to Mr. Brezhnev but then a sudden departure from the
political initiative caused great concern in his capital. The problem now is
that it is time to prevent a bloodbath in East Pakistan. It is essential that
all parties act now. A viable resolution can only transfer power to the Bangla Desh. Dr. Kissinger said
that the U.S. Government cannot go along with this kind of resolution. Mr. Vorontsov replied that the question was now academic since he
had seen on the news that the East Pakistan Government had already resigned.
Dr. Kissinger stated that he would now like to summarize his understanding.
This understanding was that:
/5/
See footnote 2, Document 302.
/6/ Vorontsov was apparently referring to the message sent by
Nixon to Brezhnev on Sunday, December 12; see Document 286.
-The
Indians would not attack the West.
-The
Indians would not seek to acquire Pakistan territory and would
return to the territorial limits that existed prior to the crisis-in other
words to a status quo ante.
Minister Vorontsov said that that would also be the Soviet Union's understanding. Dr.
Kissinger stated the issue is now to get a settlement in East Pakistan. Minister Vorontsov agreed noting that a means must be found to
prevent the bloodbath which will follow. Dr. Kissinger stated that the original
U.S. statement was an
objective one not suitable for a U.N. resolution. Minister Vorontsov
agreed. Dr. Kissinger stated that continual haggling between parties in the
Security Council could only lead to sterile results. If it continues, it cannot
sit well with the United States Government. For this reason, something like the U.K. resolution, which the United States side does not like
either, appears to offer the best compromise. On the other hand, if the Soviets
continue to seek a fait accompli, then the U.S. Government must draw its own
conclusions from this reality. Minister Vorontsov
asked what Dr. Kissinger considered an ideal solution. Dr. Kissinger stated
that the U.S. Government knows that East Pakistan will not go back to the
West. On the other hand, the U.S. cannot legally accept
an overt change in status at this moment, and efforts within the United Nations
to force the U.S. Government to do so must be vetoed. The U.S. considers that a fait
accompli has occurred in the East and the problem is to proceed from that
point. On the other hand, India seeks not only to break
East
Pakistan
away from the West but to do so under a mantle of legitimacy. This is more than
the United States can accept. Just two
weeks ago, Madame Gandhi said that the situation in East Pakistan was an internal
Pakistani problem. Thus, steps from this point on should be to stop the
fighting. Why should the United States struggle with the Soviet Union at costs in its
relations with the Soviets on an issue like the Bangla
Desh, especially when there are such great issues
like the Middle
East
to be settled between the two sides? Furthermore, the United States is not anti-India as
some would infer. Certainly, the Soviets know what the real problem is.
Minister Vorontsov stated that the real problem in
Moscow is concern that the United States continually airs its
complaints in the press. Statements like the Summit statement earlier in
the day cause real problems in Moscow. Dr. Kissinger stated
that General Haig had advised Minister Vorontsov that we had waited for an extended period for a
Soviet response but none was forthcoming. The U.S. had informed the Soviet
Government that we were prepared to take parallel action and was confident that
the Soviets would join with us. There is no way that the U.S. could permit Pakistan to be dismembered
officially in the United Nations framework. It was the U.S. view that an agreement
could be worked out between the two governments quietly in the confidential
channel. Certainly, the Chinese would oppose such a solution in the United
Nations. President Nixon interpreted the Soviet response as a delaying action.
Minister Vorontsov noted that the U.S. neglected to reiterate
the West
Pakistan
concession made in Dacca. Dr. Kissinger stated
that the President did not focus specifically on that issue. For that matter,
Dr. Kissinger himself did not. The U.S. now appreciates this
and therefore both sides could wind up the matter without further delay.
Minister Vorontsov said that the Soviets would need
some help with respect to the Summit statement as soon as
possible that would tend to limit the damage in Moscow. Dr. Kissinger stated
that the U.S. side would calm public
speculation on the issue. Dr. Kissinger directed General Haig
to insure that Press Secretary Ziegler modify the exaggerated play that was
given to the statement on Air Force One. Dr. Kissinger continued that since
Friday,/7/ President Nixon had been concerned that the
Soviet leaders were not doing all possible to arrive at a settlement. On the
way to the Azores, he commented that it
would have been most helpful if he could tell the French that the U.S. and the Soviets had
concerted to arrive at a settlement. In the face of continued delays, however,
the President began to believe that the Soviet Government was providing words
only with the view towards letting events on the ground dictate the ultimate
outcome. It is not President Nixon's style to threaten. Certainly he hopes that
the U.S./Soviet Summit will work but in this
context, President Nixon has long sought a genuine change in U.S./Soviet
relations. Despite his desires, however, the Soviets proceed to equip India with great amounts of
sophisticated armaments. If the Soviet Government were to support or to
pressure other foreign leaders to dismember or to divide an ally of the United States, how can the Soviet
leaders expect progress in our mutual relationships? This is the source of the
President's concern. He has never questioned mere atmospherics but intends to
make major progress in U.S. Soviet relations.
/7/
December 10.
The
meeting adjourned at 7:00 p.m.
Source: Document 305, volume XI, South
Asia crisis 1971, Department of State.