Department State Washington DC

Secret December 14, 1971

Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

The White House

 

Subject: Military Supplies for Pakistan

 

Our earlier memorandum on this subject (December 9) stated that there are no legal impediments to the resumption of military supplies to Paki­stan. However, the expiration of Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) since that memorandum was written causes some problems. In addition, there are some practical aspects of the means of providing as­sistance that should be taken into account if a decision is made to do so.

 

Cash Sales: To sell military supplies to Pakistan would be the sim­plest method for the USG. However, the Pakistan Government is suf­fering from an extreme shortage of foreign exchange and is already in default on its debts to a number of governments, including the United States. Cash sales do not therefore appear to be a realistic way of providing assistance.

 

Military Assistance: Help could be provided through MAP. The major problem here would relate to the general shortage of funds. All indica­tions from the Conference- Committee are that the authorization will be at most $502 million. If there is no aid legislation for FY 1972, a CRA would probably provide at most only $452 million. These limited funds will require severe constraints on our three largest and most important programs (Cambodia, Korea, and Turkey) and will require sharp cut­backs in virtually all other programs. It will therefore be difficult to find any substantial amount in MAP funds to finance assistance to Pakistan without producing serious adverse effects on other security assistance programs of importance to the United States.

 

Credit Sales: As soon as we have a new CRA or FY 1972 aid legisla­tion, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits should be used. As a result of

cuts made by the Congress in the Administration's authorization re­quests, credit funds will also he in short supply but that shortage will not be so critical as the shortage in MAP funds. FMS credit sales would therefore appear to be the best means of providing assistance to Paki­stan.

 

Excess Defense Articles: There might be some excess articles that Paki­stan could use. The provision of excess is normally a time-consuming process, however, and, in addition, funds would have to be found from MAP or FMS credit for the rehabilitation, packing and shipping of such articles.

 

Third Country Transfers: Transfers of equipment from third countries (e.g., Jordan, Iran, Turkey) would avoid the immediate problem of finding a means to finance the transaction. Nevertheless, our role in ar­ranging such transfers and our consent to them would undoubtedly lead to expectations on the part of the third country involved that the USG would reimburse it in kind or in cash. The problem of financing assis­tance would therefore arise at a slightly later date and would have to be handled within the limitations stated above, through MAP or FMS, or excess.

 

Transfer from DOD Stocks: Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the President to take military equipment from U.S. military stocks and use it for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act if he determines that such action is "vital to the security of the United States." This special authority has been used rarely in the past. It could not be used now until a new CRA or FY 1972 aid legislation is in effect.

 

Continuing Resolution Authority: CRA expired on December 8. As noted above, in the absence of a new CRA we could not extend FMS credit, nor could the President authorize the transfer of equipment from U.S. military stocks. It should also be noted that we do not know what levels would be established for MAP and FMS in a new CRA. Some consideration is being given at present to a CRA limited to "salaries and expenses." Such a CRA would severely limit our ability to provide assistance to Pakistan. The only realistic possibility would be to re-allocate funds from the other MAP programs, which will already be suffering severe shortages.

 

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Executive Secretary

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 437 - 438