Telegram
from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the
President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 643,
Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan. Top Secret, Flash, Sensitive, Exclusively
Eyes Only. Received at 1732Z.
Lajes Air Field,
AWH
10038.
My present view on India-Pakistan is as follows:
1. We are
positioned well but we must be as careful not to be maneuvered into the
position of the last hold-out as we must be to avoid being the first to cave.
2. I
therefore suggest that if Security Council is still deadlocked tomorrow morning
or the Soviets have vetoed we should consider backing a resolution for
cease-fire and later withdrawal-even if Soviet answer is not yet received. Can
we position Bhutto to get some of his friends to surface such a resolution? We
should trigger stage 2 even if we have not heard from Soviets tomorrow. Can I
see what such a resolution would look like. Let us discuss
that.
3. As for
fleet, I am weighing advantage of moving it against risk of being called off
prematurely by public pressure. Can we put it into
/2/ Apparent reference to a proposed discussion among Nixon,
Kissinger, Rogers, and Connally on the plane
scheduled to return the party to
[Omitted
here are instructions from Kissinger on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.]
Source: Document 294, volume XI,