Backchannel
Message from the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Ambassador to
/1/
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 643,
Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan. Top Secret;
Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig
signed for Kissinger; there is no indication on the message that Kissinger
cleared it. The time of transmission is from an attached note.
We have
just learned that Bhutto approached Bush in
/2/ This exchange between Bush and Bhutto was reported in
telegram 4979 from USUN, December 13. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL
27 INDIA-PAK)
/3/
See footnote 3, Document 285.
Calls
upon the GOP to take effective action towards a political settlement in
This as you
know marks departure from game plan/4/ and we are concerned that introduction
of this type of clause, particularly at this point, could lead to quick
dissolution of our position. Soviets would veto on one-Pakistan grounds and
then would be locked into a position on political issue. Debate on political
question would inevitably ensue and hope for quick ceasefire
evaporate. For our part we want to stick with game plan.
/4/
See Document 276.
Would
appreciate knowing soonest whether Bhutto proposal represents instruction from
/5/ Farland took up the proposed amendment with Foreign
Secretary Sultan Khan who consulted with President Yahya
and reported back that, assuming the revised resolution provided for an
immediate cease-fire, Yahya approved the amendment
proposed by Bhutto. Sultan Khan emphasized the importance of an immediate
cease-fire in order to stop what he characterized as the slaughter in
Source: Document 293, volume XI,