272.
Backchannel Message from the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to
/1/
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 643,
Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan, December 1-10. Top
Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No time of transmittal appears
on the message.
Ref:
[message number not declassified]/2/
/2/
Document 271.
We are
making strongest démarche to Soviets today which
proposes that they join with us in supporting provisos contained in my message
of December 9/3/ and paragraph 3 of your [message number not declassified]
which provides (a) India and Pakistan should agree to an immediate ceasefire
with the separate armed forces "standing fast"; and that the United
Nations or other international organization provide observers to see that the
ceasefire is effective; (b) that India and Pakistan "at any effective
level" immediately open negotiations aimed at a settlement of the war and
troop withdrawal; and coincident therewith negotiations be started looking
towards the political satisfaction of Bengali aspirations; i.e., a political
settlement.
/3/
Document 259.
It is essential
that Government of Pakistan refrain from making additional proposals until we
have had opportunity to move within the above framework.
In
discussing the foregoing procedure with Yahya, you
should emphasize that the President has made the strongest démarche
to the Soviets and included warning to them that we have obligations towards
Source: Document 272, volume XI,