Department of State

 

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 634

 

 

STATE 221974

42

ORIGIN SS-07

INFO OCT-O1 CCO-00 SSO-00 FILE-01 /009 R

66604

DRAFTED BY: S/S/O : WARNICK

APPROVED BY: DDO : CHRISTIANSON

                                                     …………………025436

O 091734 Z DEC 71 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 221974

EXDIS

TOSEC 34.

FOL SENT DEPT INFO CALCUTTA, DACCA, HONG KONG, KABUL, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, LAHORE, LONDON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN, USUN, DEC 8, 1971

REPEATED YOU

QUOTE:

CONFIDENTIAL ISLAMABAD 12205

 

EXDIS

SUBJ : BHUTTO'S VIEWS ON EVE OF DEPARTURE FOR NEW YORK

 

1. SUMMARY: On eve of mission UNGA, People's Party leader Z.A. Bhutto­Newly designated by Yahya as vice Primin-said he will do utmost to bring about ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. He is also ready to do what he can to achieve satisfactory political accommodation with East Pakistan. Including active negotiation

with Mujib. Bhutto expressed interest in meeting with Pres. Nixon. End summary.

 

2. At Bhutto's suggestion, DCM met with him at Rawalpindi hotel evening Dec. 7. Local radio had just announced Pres. Yahya's decision to form central government in which Bhutto would be Vice Prime Minister. Radio added (and Bhutto confirmed) he would also be Foreign -Minister. Embassy had learned earlier in day that Bhutto had also been asked by Yahya to represent Pakistan at UNGA debate on Indo-Pak

crisis. Bhutto said he would be leaving Dec. 8 morning by road for Kabul whence he would fly to New York where he expected arrive by Dec. 9 evening. He thought central government would actually by formed following his return from UNGA

debate.

 

3. Bhutto recalled his various statements in recent months on urgent need for transfer of power to civilian government. Pakistan had had too many years of military leadership. The generals don't have the breadth of vision needed to deal with Pakistan's many problems. Acknowledging that Yahya had paved way for Pakistan's first general elections, Bhutto said the 1970 political campaign had gone on too long. As for crisis which began last March, current tragic culmination might have been headed off if Yahya had given way months ago to civilian government as Bhutto had been urging. Civilian government might have shown flexibility needed to cooperate with formidable problems in relations between East and West Pakistan.

 

4. DCM said he understood PPP had been allotted six National Assembly seats out of existing vacancies from East Pakistan. He recalled Bhutto's comment during their last conversation in October that PPP had been counting on 25 seats from East Pakistan, and said he assumed issue had somehow been worked out to Bhutto's satisfaction. Bhutto acknowledged that PPP was likely to be less strong in Assembly than he would have liked but said that Party could get some seats additional to six already allocated from East Wing. He indicated he was ready to take his place in new government and implied that he would be principal power in it.

 

5. Bhutto recalled that he had told Ambassador and DCM various times during recent months that he was committed to do what he could, when he was in appropriate official position, to improve and strengthen US-Pak relations. He intended to carry out that promise.

 

6. As for UNGA debate, it was very late but Bhutto said he would do his best to halt the fighting and bring peace. He noted that this would be his first visit to US since he represented Pakistan at UN debate following 1965 Indo-Pak hostilities. His effort now would be to promote immediate agreement for ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to their own territory.

 

7. Bhutto said it was most important that USG use its influence with USSR so that Soviets lay off and not stand in way of immediate end to fighting. He said it was clear to him that Soviets were using India to achieve their own national objectives of implanting themselves firmly in Southern Asia and Indian Ocean area. He personally "as not surprised by current Soviet tactics although he deplored them. US influence had to be brought to bear on USSR. DCM noted that we had indeed been trying to work out common approach with Soviets that would have averted current fighting.

 

8. DCM asked if he could presume to offer some purely personal advice to Bhutto on points which he might wish keep in mind in addressing UNGA. Noted that Bhutto himself had made all of these points in conversations with DCM during recent months and they could be expected to provide added impact to whatever he would say in UNGA. First point was to express genuine horror over course of tragic events in East Pakistan in recent months and sympathy for untold human suffering there. Second point was urgent need for political accommodation which would be consistent with desires of people of East Pakistan. Third point was need for a basic reconciliation between India and Pakistan so that both nations could live together in peace and devote themselves fully to the needs of their people.

 

9. Bhutto responded that all of these points indeed represented his own views. He would have them in mind in making his own presentation to UNGA although he would of course have to be careful to avoid giving anyone impression that he was selling out to India rpt India.

 

10. Regarding political accommodation, Bhutto said he was personally prepared

to talk to Mujib and try to work out even loosest form of association between East

and West Pakistan. As leading figure in new government, he had right to ask for such

approach. He implied he was ahead of Nurul Amin (Bengali designated by Yahya to be Primin) on this particular point and that Bhutto would have leading role in trying to work out satisfactory accommodation with Awami Leaguers.

 

11. In response Bhutto's question, DCM said he thought Bhutto was still much indentified in Indian eyes as protagonist of Indo-Pak confrontation rather that reconciliation. Bhutto therefore faced delicate and difficult task in convincing Indians (as well as world opinion) that his views had- veered toward reconciliation. Bhutto

 acknowledged this. He said he would be prepared to go to Delhi himself to talk to GOI at appropriate time.

 

12. DCM asked what role Bhutto thought China might play in absence of early agreement on ceasefire. Bhutto said China would take variety of steps to back Pakistan but avided any specifics on outcome his November visit to Peking as head of Pak delegation. He mentioned possibility that Nepal's concern over its relations with India could somehow be brought into act, giving China basis for explaining its position in terms of concerns felt by two of its neighbors (Pakistan and Nepal) in their dealings with India. DCM was left with impression that Chinese had in fact avoided committing themselves to Paks as much as GOP would have liked in this regard.

 

13. In concluding conversation, Bhutto said he hoped visit Washington during forthcoming trip to UNGA and that he would like very much to meet with Pres. Nixon. DCM said he was in Washington when Bhutto had told Ambassador Farland in November of his desire to meet with President. (Islamabad 10988.) No commitment could then be given in view of many demands on President's schedule but Bhutto could have counted at that time on meeting with senior officials of State Department. DCM acknowledged that there was now new element in that Bhutto had been designated as leading figure in proposed new central government. Said he would promptly report to ambassador and department Bhutto's renewed expression of interest in meeting President in Washington. Bhutto said this was all he could ask for.

 

14. In view Bhutto's new position of prominence, I recommend that he be given opportunity to meet with President if possible during forthcoming visit to US.

 

GP-3  FARLAND

Unquote. IRWIN

 

 

Source:  The American Papers – Secret and Confidential India.Pakistan.Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973, University Press Limited, p.738 -740