Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Conversation between President Nixon and his Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger),
Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, this thing is beginning
to shape up. [5 seconds not
declassified] Bhutto is coming over
here. The
Nixon: Bhutto?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: That son-of-bitch?
Kissinger: Yeah.
But we understand that his instructions are to offer a settlement very
close to what we have. What we are
putting to them.
Nixon: I noticed, I read that in the news summary, I
mean in this morning’s briefing.
Kissinger: That he’s coming?
Nixon: Yeah, that he’s coming,
and that Yahya may be setting him up to make a sell
out in order to [unclear]. He’s a bad
man. Bhutto’s a terrible bastard.
Kissinger: But the point is if we get this, you see, if
we get this offer, if we get Yahya to agree with this
proposition, then we can go back to the Russians and settle this thing. And we’ll be in good graces with the Chinese
because we’ve got the summit with Yahya’s
concurrence. We’ll have squared the
circle. Then after we settle it, we put
the bastards here to the torch by saying that we were playing this game
[unclear]. I think we’re going to pull
it off.
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: Well, they will lose
Nixon: We all know that.
Kissinger: But the question is how they lose it.
Nixon: And
Kissinger: Well, they may be so demented that, well, yes
by now they have to think it.
Nixon: Well, for Christ sakes. Well, how will it be done then? It’ll be done through,
they’ll make an offer for a political settlement with
Kissinger: No, but that wouldn’t be, no, the Russians
will. That’s the interesting thing in
the Brezhnev letter. The Brezhnev letter
says the negotiations should start at the point at which they were interrupted
on March 25, 1970. At that point, East
Pakistan was part of
Nixon: They have.
They have stated that.
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: In the letters.
Kissinger: In the letter. Now if we, if you and Brezhnev, could make a
joint declaration. The way I see this
thing evolving, if we get Yahya aboard by tomorrow
morning, and the time factor works for us—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: It could be a joint appeal by you and
Brezhnev along these three lines. If the
Indians reject it, then we go to the United Nations Security Council and
get—this time the Soviets have to support us in the Security Council because
it’s a joint—
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: So then we’ve got the Indians at a
disadvantage. And we’ll have separated
the Soviets from the Indians to some extent.
Nixon: Um, hmh.
Kissinger: If the Indians accept it, then what will
happen, first of all, it will then save
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —for the
time being. And if the Indians—
Nixon: The Indians will stop, and there’ll be a
cease-fire. But the Indians will stay in
Kissinger: Well, what will happen then is a negotiation between
the East Pakistan leaders and the West Pakistan leaders, which if one, which
will probably lead to the independence of
Nixon: All right.
Now—
Kissinger: You know, it’s a lousy outcome, but we are
now talking, Mr. President, of—
Nixon: Well, it was sort of inevitable.
Kissinger: I mean, when it’s all done it will—
Nixon: They were too clumsy, the
Kissinger: When it’s all, if we come out of it that way,
Mr. President—
Nixon: If we can save a strong
Kissinger: We’ll have accomplished a lot, and all the
bleeders about
Nixon: Well, if we ever get the Russians to go with
us on this, that could be a watershed in the relations
between the two countries. That’s why I
wish Dobrynin was here so you could tell him exactly
that.
Kissinger: I know.
But it’s better with this guy because he’s got to report it. Dobrynin would have
argued with you and tried to pitch.
Nixon: Did you notice we stopped him? We didn’t have arguments.
Kissinger: Yeah, well it would have been harder for Dobrynin, to stop Dobrynin. So actually I think, I told Haig I thought this was one of your finest hours here
because anybody else that I know would have said the hell with it. We have no chance. It’s a long shot. Why jeopardize the summit? And I think you’ll have strengthened the
summit when it’s all over.
Nixon: The Russians could come back with a
hard-nosed message.
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: I don’t see how they can.
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: You know, when you really put it in terms of
basically a lawyer arguing a case, I made such a strong case of how much was on
the plate, how much they were going to risk at such a cheap small game that
they just can’t. I don’t see how they
could possibly turn it down. If they do,
they aren’t worth dealing with. Huh?
Kissinger: Every instinct I have tells me they won’t
turn it down.
Nixon: Well, Vorontsov,
you know, made notes for [unclear].
Kissinger Every
instinct—because basically it accepts their framework. We should get a letter to them tomorrow sort
of summarizing what you said as a formal reply.
Nixon: Well, could you get something done, prepared?
Kissinger: Yeah, I’ll have it for you first thing
tomorrow.
Nixon: I think we ought to get it off right away to
Brezhnev.
Kissinger: Tomorrow morning. Now because—
Nixon: You know, it’s an
interesting thing how these people are the same. This fellow here, who is incidentally, he is
a nice guy, and he hasn’t changed. Just
think 12 years ago. He comes in and says
I haven’t changed, but boy you should see him.
He hasn’t changed one bit. Still got the [unclear].
But this fellow went through the same line that Gromyko
did about how Brezhnev was a warmhearted man, a good man,
and so forth and so on.
Kissinger: Brezhnev has a hell of a lot at stake in this
meeting with you, Mr. President.
Nixon: He wants it to succeed, you think?
Kissinger: Yeah. The
sons-of-bitches in this country can piss on you as much as they want.
Nixon: They do.
Kissinger: Outside this country you are the world leader
right now. I mean, why the hell would
Trudeau, who dislikes everything you stand for, who in his style, in his baggy
style, is as different from you as two human beings can be.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: How, why does he say it was a fantastic
revolutionary concept? First, because it
was, of course, well put. But also
because he feels he wants to be identified with the leader of the, at least the
non-communist world.
Nixon: He was hurting with his identification with
Kosygin, and he wanted to be identified as American.
Kissinger: Yeah, but he didn’t say this about
Kosygin. And he couldn’t have because
his domestic opinion wouldn’t—
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: If he had said Kosygin made a revolutionary—
Nixon: Well, that vote at the UN wasn’t too bad
too. That had some reflection of this.
Kissinger: That’s right.
I mean, our liberal establishment is intellectually, it’s morally
corrupt, but it’s also intellectually so totally corrupt. What they’re telling you is, in effect, to
preside over the rape of an ally, to which Kennedy has a commitment. What you are almost certainly going to achieve
is the preservation of
Nixon: Well, it was done before.
Kissinger: But we didn’t urge him to go into
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: And we can’t be given the impossible.
Nixon: One thing I want you to do, Connally mentioned to staff. I want you to take, this is an order, $25
million, take it out of the Indian money and go to the Indonesians in need of
it. Now by God that is to be done. I want the Indonesians to be, a Muslim
country to know that we’re their friends.
I think that will have repercussions right away.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Agreed?
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon: All right.
Can you issue that order?
Kissinger: I’ll get it done this minute.
Nixon: Put it out.
What I meant is, Henry, put it under my name if necessary.
Kissinger: Oh, no, no, no.
Nixon: I’m not going to have any screwing around.
[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to
Nixon: You think State will call in the Indian Ambassador
and tell him that?
Kissinger: Well, Irwin was so shaken he hardly knew what
to say.
Nixon: Well, give him instructions. Give him a talking paper and the rest. Will he do that? Or what? What are you going to do? I don’t know what the hell they’re—
Kissinger: Oh no, no.
He’ll now carry it out.
Nixon: Well goddamnit, it
must be, it would be very easy for me, for anybody to tell the Indian
Ambassador we will not tolerate acquisition of territory, right? Well, for Christ sakes, you’ve got to say
that much.
Kissinger: No, no.
We’re in.
Nixon: What else they do, I don’t know.
Kissinger: We’re getting it.
Nixon: I’ll tell you one thing, the—
Kissinger: I think we’ll be over it by this time next
week.
Nixon: [unclear]
He’s going to feel, they’re going to think twice over there before they
allow any inspired leaks, piss on the White House for a couple of days. Oh, they’ll still come, but they can’t help
but know, that whole establishment over there, how I
feel about it. I mean, I know what
they’re doing. I read the damn papers.
Kissinger: I think we’re over the hump. My instinct tells me that this is not going
to build into a confrontation. These
Russians are slobbering all over you.
Nixon: You think we’ve got the bureaucracy lined up
[unclear]?
Kissinger: I thought it was essential. We’ll have a well-behaved WSAG meeting
tomorrow, I hope. First
time in 4 weeks.
Nixon: For the first time in 4 weeks you say?
Kissinger: Yeah.
The others aren’t so bad, I mean, Packard is fine. Moorer is fine,
Packard is fine, Helms is fine.
Nixon: Well, they got that Moorer
knows about moving that ship.
Kissinger: Oh, yeah.
Oh, no, we’re doing everything that can be done now.
Nixon: We’re right to move the carrier. If you’re going to make a move, Christ, move
the carrier.
Kissinger: In fact, even if there is a settlement, we
should move the force in there just to show we can do it and take it out again.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: Then no one can accuse us of anything.
Nixon: That’s right.
We move the carrier. Get the
planes over. Call in the Indian
Ambassador. I thought it was good to
report to this group that I’ve just told the Russian minister, and you’re going
to tell him anyway.
Kissinger: No, but this way I don’t have to tell him.
Nixon: Good.
Kissinger: This is even better. This way I don’t—
Nixon: [unclear] told the Russian.
Kissinger: This way I don’t have to do—
Nixon: Without poisoning our relations. Also, I thought it was, nobody that was there
was taking it down, but, you know, it’s too bad—
Kissinger: No, Haig was taking
it down.
Nixon: The point that I made that, I said I know the
usual line here is the same as what’s—
Kissinger: I know.
Nixon: The diplomatic line is to let the dust settle
until you no longer see the grave. And I
said that’s not my policy.
Kissinger: I thought that was powerful. Haig said this was
the most powerful statement he’s heard you make in WSAG. It was really strong. You know, if it works it will look
inevitable.
[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s schedule.]
Nixon: I’ll bet you that wire to
Kissinger: We’ll have an answer to that tomorrow. Saturday morning at the
latest.
Nixon: Well, I was conciliatory though, Henry. I did say, I said as far as this deal is
concerned, all that we ask is restrain the Indians, let’s have a ceasefire, they must have a political settlement. As a matter of fact, it was his deal that we
were talking about.
Kissinger: Well, there were a few hookers in there the
way you put it. You said, "Talk to
the Awami League."
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And the way they put it was,
it has to start where it stopped on March 25, which really means freeing Mujib.
Nixon: I see.
Kissinger: On the other, but—
Nixon: That’s negotiable too.
Kissinger: But I would figure, Mr. President, that’s not
what we get into in the first phase. In
the first phase, we should state a few general principles. The major thing is to defang the Indians
now. The Pakistanis have lost 80 percent
of their POL. They bombed
Nixon: Thirty percent?
Kissinger: An extraordinary achievement, which is not
warranted by the situation.
Nixon: Because the Indians are ready to gobble it
up?
Kissinger: Because if State played its usual game, it
will send a message to [New]
Nixon: You know another point that State needs to
get pounded into its goddamned head is that we do not determine our policy
around here solely on the basis of how many people are on one side.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Yeah. Well, you made that point.
Nixon: And how many, and whether a country is a
democracy or whether it is not a democracy.
Kissinger: That’s another point you made.
Nixon: By God, we just don’t do it that way. I mean, it doesn’t make, an evil deed is not
made good by the form of government that executes the deed, Henry. I mean, as I’ve often said, the most horrible
wars in history have been fought between the Christian nations of
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Right?
Does that make them right?
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon. No, sir. No, sir.
Kissinger: And between, the governments prior to World
War I were all more or less the same, with the exception of the Czar. I mean, that German emperor wasn’t all that
powerful.
Nixon: Well, he was a Christian monarch.
Kissinger: I mean, they had a
pretty democratic government. He sort of
strutted around and made it look as if he were powerful.
Nixon: Well, I don’t know. I hope it works. I hope it works from the Russian
standpoint. I just can’t believe
Brezhnev can hear this being said. And I
must, I think your hunch is right, saying it to this guy was,
it was just an accident. But saying it
to him was very important. He could see
that I was fair, I was conciliatory, but tough as
hell.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: And he saw that too. And I said there’d be a confrontation.
Kissinger: And you listed all the things you were
willing to do. It was a
masterpiece. It was the subtlety, and
then you were expecting—you want to jeopardize European Security, Middle East,
SALT, all of that, for what? And you said
there’d be a confrontation.
Nixon: Also pointing out that we had a treaty with
Kissinger: Mr. President, if this were
a key country to them they might challenge you.
But why should they run this risk to back you down? First of all, no one knows you’ve
threatened.
Nixon: No. I
told him, you know. I said, "I am
not threatening anything."
Kissinger: And besides, you can do a lot of things. I mean, if the principle gets established
that the stronger country can prevail with the backing of another country, we
could unleash the Israelis and kill the Egyptians.
Nixon: We might do that.
Kissinger: I mean we won’t do it but—
Nixon: Who knows?
Kissinger: But I mean, just looking at it from their
point of view.
Nixon: Who knows?
Who knows?
Kissinger: Every time we’ve played them this way it’s
come out all right. And they know, they
said you’ve just done too many unpredictable things. No, I think this was a great day.
Nixon: We shall see.
We shall see.
Kissinger: We may lose on it. We were certain—
Nixon: Well at least we tried.
Kissinger: We were certain to lose the other way. We may win this way.
Nixon: Well, we tried. Some people, the Russians cannot ignore
this. They just can’t let the—
Kissinger: Oh, no.
Oh, no. You’ll get an answer
within, by Sunday morning.
Nixon: The Russians, I think, the real question is
whether they will just lean on the Indians now.
Kissinger: That’s what it amounts to. And anything we get in this connection is
money in the bank a) in the sense of defeating, of protecting
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: So if we can stop an Indian onslaught on
Nixon: You think so?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah.
Nixon: Well, they’re going to be thwarted in another
way. Now, I will not listen to any
suggestions that that aid be restored.
Kissinger: No matter what happens, Mr. President.
Nixon: No, sir.
Kissinger: That is what we have to be—
Nixon: I will not listen to it. Now these bastards have asked for it, and
they’re not going to get it. Now I think
we’re going to have to play that game.
They chose
Kissinger: Absolutely.
What I would do with the Indians, Mr. President, is keep them in the
deep freeze until after your election.
After you’re elected they’ll come to you hat in hand.
Nixon: Well, we don’t want—
Kissinger: No, no.
But then, I don’t think Indian animosity can hurt you if there’s no
war. I don’t know which American likes
Nixon: Nobody.
Kissinger: Except those intellectuals who are against
you.
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: Yeah, but they’re against you anyway.
[The brief conclusion of the conversation is unclear.]
Source:
Doc 171, vol E7,