Secret Telegram
December
7, 1971
From: American Embassy New Delhi
To: Secretary State Washington DC
1. Summary: Foreign Minister Swaran Singh asked me
to see him December 7, and proceeded to review at length historical development
East
Pakistan crisis. He expressed deep regret that ambassador Bush should have
referred to Indian army operations as "aggression". Foreign Minister
asked me to convey to the Secretary his personal appeal to reconsider US
position in the light of developments that have taken place, as well as the
emerging realities. End Summary.
2. At his request I called on Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh, December 7. The Foreign Minister began by saying that he thought
it would be useful for us to review what has happened and to "project ourselves
in the future difficult situation". He thought it was important to be able
to see "where things are moving".
3. The Foreign Minister said that on the Eastern
side "we are quite clear on what we are doing". India was making no territorial
claims of any type. The announcement of Indian recognition of the government
of Bangla Desh, December 6, had to be viewed in that context. This amounted to
a form of self-restraint on themselves. They wanted everyone to understand that
it was not Indian intention to annex or occupy any territory. The recognition
of Bangla Desh had been done to project India's objectives in the area.
4. The Foreign Minister said that recognition had
become a necessity because they were concerned about certain allegations that
were being bandied about. The Chinese had already alleged that India wanted to annex territory.
Ambassador Bush had also talked about "aggression". No one should be
in doubt regarding Indian intentions.
5. Another aspect of recognition was the practical
rather than ideological one, "there are fairly large areas over which we
now have control". The military writ of West Pakistan did not run over the
greater part of East Bengal "or, as we call it, Bangla Desh". The people
of the area now again are "coming to a boiling point". The effervescent
attitude that one saw at the time of elections a year ago was now being seen
again. The Indian army was being welcomed as liberators.
6. The Foreign Minister said it was no secret that
the Bengali component of the civil service of East Pakistan owed allegiance to Bangla
Desh and was not with the military regime. Those in areas controlled by the Pakistan army were only going
through the motions. There was a great risk that the situation would
deteriorate into chaos. There were some communist extremists in certain areas
throughout East Bengal. A kind of vacuum was being created in the
administration of the area. There had been a great risk that the vacuum would
in turn deteriorate into chaotic conditions.
7. In these circumstances, the Foreign Minister
asked rhetorically, what were India's alternatives? He said
they could have thought of initially of Indian administration. This, however,
would have been superfluous in the circumstances. Such an administration would
have been appropriate if the army were occupying an area where there would be
resistance from the local population. This, however, was far from the case, and
India did not wish to provide even a semblance of
Indian administration of the liberated areas. Therefore, it had been necessary
for the GOI to back some central authority which in turn could control the
upsurge of enthusiasm, control the unruly elements, and fill the vacuum. Indian
recognition of Bangla Desh also was an effort to curb local extremist elements.
It amounted to a denial of any Indian administrative role and permitted an
indigenous alternative. Because of these developments the GOI had concluded
that they could not wait. There were pressing reasons why the Prime Minister
had to announce recognition when she did.
8. The Foreign Minister said that wherever the army
had gone they had been openly welcomed. Under strict orders they were behaving
in such a way as not to damage persons or property. They were not out for
anyone's blood. It was their hope that military operations would lead to a
minimum of destruction. He claimed the army was avoiding direct conflict with
the Pakistani army. All of this was background for the GOI decision to
recognize Bangla Desh.
9. The Foreign Minister said that this Indian step
should also help to consolidate the moderate forces in Bangla Desh. There were
those who were opposed, i.e., extremists led by Toaha, etc. It had therefore
been necessary that there be some consolidation of forces. The Foreign
Minister said that their consolidation of forces also kept the door open for Pakistan to deal with the Bangla
Desh government. India still said that it was for
the elected representatives of the people of Bangla Desh to decide what they
wanted. He hoped Indian recognition would be viewed in that perspective.
10. The Foreign Minister said, "We are greatly
disturbed by the thought that there was a misunderstanding in the US of our objectives".
He said, "I was extremely unhappy that Ambassador Bush referred to us as
aggressors". On the western borders India had not moved its troops to
the frontier until seven to fourteen days after the Pakistani army had done so.
Strict orders had been issued to Indian troops to keep absolutely quiet. The
Foreign Minister reminded me that he had previously explained to me the
developing situation in the East. The first escalation had been that of
Pakistani aircraft which were shot down over Indian territory. Even then, he pointed out,
the Prime Minister had treated this matter as a local incident and had
purposely tried to soft-pedal it. The Foreign Minister admitted that in private
he had made no secret about how bitterly he had felt about this development. He
said Indian
territory had been subject to continuous shelling. Hundreds of violations had
taken place, killing many local people. The Indian army had not been moved
"in any big way"
11. Against this background suddenly India had been subjected to a
well planned aerial attack in the West, in which almost simultaneously a
number of Indian air force stations had been raided. Following that attack Pakistan claimed that India had attacked earlier on the
ground. This was "totally false and concocted". He stressed that Pakistan had made their claim of
Indian attacks on the ground after repeat after the GOI had announced that the
Pak Air Force had attacked. He said this had been a "blatant attack on
our positions". The Foreign Minister said he could have understood if Pakistan had said that they had
launched such an attack because of Indian actions in the East, but they had not
said that. Originally, he added, "what little support we gave was to the
Mukti Bahini". Subsequently they had had to defend themselves. Against
this background, for Indian military operations to be described as "aggression
really make us extremely unhappy".
12. The Foreign Minister asked rhetorically what was
the projection for the future, particularly in light of the extremely political
attitude of the martial law administration. He felt certain this was a question
that the US must also ask itself. He
assumed that we would want to take a good look at the aspirations of the people
of the area, the way they were thinking, and the manner in which they were
responding to the situation. Against this background it was "not very
realistic to stick with the idea that the Pakistani military regime had to be
bailed out". He expressed the hope that our differences should not affect
our relations. He said he had been disturbed at the recent steps taken by USG,
such as cancellation of military supplies and, more recently, the withholding
of economic aid but they could "live with that". The Foreign Minister
said he continued to hope there could be understanding between our two
governments. It was for this reason that he wanted to give me his assessment,
and he hoped that we in turn would give him ours.
13. I thanked the Foreign Minister for his
exposition and said that I didn't believe the USG had ever charged that India had territorial ambitions,
and agreed that allegations to this effect were denied by Indian recognition of
the government of Bangla Desh. I said that the position of my government had
been set forth in Ambassador Bush's clear presentation before the United
Nations Security Council and therefore was little I could add. I told him that
no one contended that the government of India had anything to do with the
original situation in East Bengal which led to ten million
refugees crossing into India. Subsequently, however, I
believed that the GOI had overreacted in stepping up its activities in support
of the Mukti Bahini to the extent that they did. This had in turn been followed
by intrusion of Indian army troops into East Bengal. I told the Foreign
Minister that I thought this had been unfortunate since it triggered a reaction
among the American people and press. Newspapers which had been completely on India's side began to say that
the Indian army was taking more than simple defensive measures. I reminded him
that I had categorized this action to Foreign Secretary Kaul as an
"offensive defense". I said this was the general impression that had
been created in the US. Furthermore, it was the
position of my government that this Indian action had triggered the action
which Pakistan had taken in the West.
14. I told the Foreign Minister I agreed that it was
a telling point that Pak air attacks on Indian air fields took place prior to
their announcement of an alleged Indian assault on the western frontier, it
was a matter of personal regret but should be noted as a reflection of the
changed mood in Congress that, from the latest information I had received, the
House of Representatives had voted out an appropriation bill which suspends
economic aid, with certain exceptions, until hostilities had ceased or until
the President had certified that it was in the US national interest to resume
it.
15. As for the situation in the United Nations,
despite the Soviet veto, the vote had been eleven and two in support of a
resolution calling for cessation of hostilities, which indicated strong support
for a cease-fire and withdrawal. The matter would now probably be presented to
the General Assembly where action would have no binding effect but I anticipate
there would be strong support for some resolution to stop the conflict. I told
him I believed there was a general feeling in the US that hostilities should be
ended and a cease-fire instituted. I assured him I would report his remarks.
16. The Foreign Minister asked me to do "with a
personal request to Secretary Rogers that he should review the situation"
particularly in its future context. He said, "we can't wish away each
other". He added that the government had been under severe pressure in
Parliament. He felt that, all things considered, the reactions to the American
position had "not been too shrill yet". I rejoined that I thought it
was "more shrill than I had expected".
17. The Foreign Minister said whether discussion
took place in the Security Council or the General Assembly, the GOI was aware
of the US position. They didn't agree since they felt we were ignoring certain
basic aspects. The GOI believed that nothing was going to happen unless this
basic problem was solved. But, he said, "President Yahya is on a collision
course". Declaring people elected unopposed and continuing to hold Sheikh
Mujib in prison wouldn't ease the situation. Even now the best step for Yahya
was to talk to the Bangla Desh leaders. India had tied its hands to the
extent that whatever these leaders agreed to India would accept.
18. I reminded the Foreign Minister that President
Yahya had expressed a willingness to talk with any Bangla Desh leaders who
were not accused of crimes. The Foreign Minister said that since that time a
month had passed and there had been no contact at all. Yahya kept thinking in
terms of quislings who would throttle the elected leaders of the people.
19. In response to my question whether the Bangla
Desh government would be led by the same people as were now in Mujibnagar, the
Foreign Minister said that he didn't know, but it was for them to decide. The
GOI did not need to replace the existing administrative setup. It didn't want
to interfere. This had been considered very carefully. Whatever was decided by
the 167 elected leaders would contribute to stabilizing the situation. The
Foreign Minister suggested that the USG do some forward thinking on how we saw
the situation developing, particularly as it had been clearly demonstrated that
the people were solidly in support of the Bangla Desh government, and opposed
to the military regime.
20. 1 told the Foreign Minister I had been surprised
by his statement that the Indian army was avoiding direct contact with the
Pakistani military in East Pakistan. I told him my information
was that Jessore might have been by-passed but that the army was moving in a
way to close in on Dacca. The Foreign Minister
claimed that he didn't know and did not ask about military plans. He
deliberately avoided finding out what military plans were. I referred to the
Defense Minister's statement that they were "going all out" in the
East. The Foreign Minister rejoined "all defense ministers have to be
tough in war situation". I told him that I hoped that all out war could be
avoided before it was too late.
21. The Foreign Minister said he would like to
believe that our two countries would both try to avoid "their being on a
deteriorating decline". I said I shared completely his hope for no
further decline in our relations. He said, "we believe we are being a
service to democratic forces and to stability in the world". What was
being done would take a great deal of effort, but India could not remain indefinitely
on the periphery. He closed by asking me again to urge the Secretary to
personally review the US position in the light of
our future best interest in the area.
22. Comment: The Foreign Minister was calm and
gentlemanly throughout his presentation. I have previously suggested that the
realities in this area receive careful study looking to the future.
Keating
Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur
Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 421 - 427