Transcript of Telephone
Conversation between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)/1/
/1/ Source: Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone
Conversations, Home File, Dec 1971. No classification marking. The President
was in Key Biscayne,
K: Mr. President.
P: Yes, Henry.
K: I just wanted to bring you
up to date on what happened. First, we positioned Ziegler with a pretty tough
statement for his press briefing to make clear where you stood and on that
basis . . .
P: They are all aware of the
fact that I am in complete touch with it all the time.
K: Well, that's what I . . . Frankly, State had put out a story this morning that you
were just being kept generally aware so we had Ziegler say that you ordered the
thing./2/
/2/ Reference is to the decision
to instruct Ambassador Bush to introduce a resolution in the UN Security
Council calling, inter alia, for a mutual withdrawal
of ground forces on the subcontinent; see footnote 5, Document 224.
P: Which is
true.
K: Which is
exactly true. You talked to me 6 times yesterday.
P: And a half a dozen times
today.
K: That's right.
P: And ordered what? You mean
on the cut-off of arms?
K: Oh, no the move to the
Security Council.
P: Right, yes.
K: I mean that you gave the
go-ahead.
P: Right.
K: And then on the basis of
that Sisco gave a backgrounder which I understand is
playing very well positioning the thing. We've drafted a very tough speech for
Bush.
P: Good.
K: And he's on the floor now.
He tells me that at the Preparatory Meeting the Chinese jumped all over the
Russians and Indians and apparently the Indians wanted to put on the agenda
only the item of problems of
P: Good. Let the liberals
choose now between
K: Exactly.
P: Very good. Boy, this really
. . . you know, we don't like this but you realize this is causing our liberal
friends untold anguish, Henry.
K: And, Mr. President,
actually in terms of the political situation, first of all we won't take any
much [more] immediate flak, but in six months the liberals are going to look
like jerks because the Indian occupation of East Pakistan is going to make the
Pakistani one look like child's play.
P: Yes. Well, the main thing
we're not going to do is be suckered by the Indians into a huge aid program. Now that I want clearly understood. You know after they have
screwed this thing up, by God, I can't emphasize too strongly how I feel. We
told Mrs. Gandhi we're going to cut off that aid and we're going to do it. Has
the word gone out?
K: The word has gone out, Mr.
President, and on Monday/3/ morning-We've already told the banks to hold it and
on Monday morning it's going to be effective. I mean nothing can happen before
Monday.
/3/ December
6.
P: I see. And you're examining
every other possibility of how we can squeeze
K: That is right, Mr.
President.
P: It's to be done. Everything
is to be held up. Everything is to be dragged. Everything
else. They cannot get away with this and . . . well, they will get away
with it, but we can't allow them to without knowing our displeasure.
K: But what we have to
reconsider now is whether it is in our interest to be the chief
development-source of development capital-of a country that has performed such
actions.
P: That's right. Oh, you mean
next year's aid program?
K: That's right.
P: That's what I want now,
though. The way I want that handled is for people like Passman
and some of our friends in the House and the Senate, even the more liberal
types, to come out and say cut aid to
K: Absolutely.
P: Let them take the lead
rather than have us take the lead.
K: Right.
P: Can we do that?
K: Certainly.
P: Well, can we put somebody
to work on it so that it'll be discreetly done. I just want . . .
K: I've already talked to Passman in that sense.
P: Well, Passman,
but there are others-there's got to be a whole plan.
K: Well, Passman
thought we should go easy until we've got the present aid program through the
budget.
P: Yes.
K: Through the Congress.
P: Yes. And then what would he
do? Then he would go after . . .
K: Next year's appropriation.
P: Is that what you're talking
about-next year's?
K: I'm talking about what we
put into the budget for '73.
P: Well, it's going to be
goddamn little that's for sure.
K: Well, that's what we should
do, Mr. President. And this year's we can also cut.
P: I want it cut what we are
doing now in fact. And as far as next year's is concerned we just cut that, but
I don't want to cut
K: We gave Scali
the facts yesterday, but we couldn't locate him today. But we've been thumping
out the facts all day and I think you will find that the combination of the
statement we got Ziegler to make, the Sisco
backgrounder and what Bush is going to say tonight is going to be quite a massive
dose.
P: It will put us on the side
of trying to restrain
K: That's right.
P: That's what I really feel
we've got to get across. Now I haven't been following the editorial comments,
what are the Times and Post and those jackasses saying?
K: Well, the Times hasn't said anything yet. The Post is bleeding about it's going to the Security Council which we've done.
P: Well, of course, but are
they blaming
K: Well, they are trying to be
pretty even-handed. They're blaming
P: We've got to make it tilt
more because we know they are totally to blame. We know that. We know the Paks don't want this.
K: That's right. Well, the Paks don't want it. The Paks
accepted every proposal of ours. I told the Indian Ambassador before he left
that we would work out a complete program with them for political autonomy within
a year if they . . .
P: You've gotten out the fact
that, for example, it may be that you ought to have a backgrounder tomorrow.
Are you in
K: No, I'm in
P: A backgrounder tomorrow
where you can point out that we told Mrs. Gandhi that the Paks
were prepared to withdraw from the border. And that we [she?] said we would be
willing to look at this and that, in spite of this they haven't done it. I
think it's very important to put the burden on
K: Well, but we haven't got
them anyway, Mr. President.
P: We've got their enmity
anyway. That's what she's shown in this goddamn thing, hasn't she?
K: I mean it isn't that we are
losing an ally. They were the ones that made a treaty with the Russians. They
are the ones that are now establishing the principle that force is the only
method-the principal method for settling disputes, and it isn't that we're
losing anything. In fact, if we do it the right way, we can still get them to
come back to us, to get back in our good graces. The Russians aren't going to
give them $700 million in development money.
P: The only thing, it is very
important to get the P.R. thing across. I do want you to try to find Scali and get him to work on the thing.
K: Right, Mr. President.
P: But he's not in town, you
say?
K: Well, I don't know. We've
been trying all day. And we are continuing to try.
P: All right. But what do you
think about your doing a backgrounder, or is that overkill?
K: I think it'd be overkill
tomorrow, but what I might do, if you agree, Mr. President, and we think it's
necessary. I worked out with Ziegler a procedure which we've always wanted to
try where I step into his briefing. I mean, he calls me in when questions start
falling and says,-why don't we get Henry on background on this-and I just step
into his briefing.
P: Why don't you do that?
K: Monday morning. By that time . . .
P: I'm having that day with
NBC that day. You could pop in and I could say Ziegler could come in and
approve it and so forth, I guess.
K: I thought one of the things
I might do, Mr. President, I've got ten minutes with
you in the morning, to brief you on the
P: Sure, sure. Or anything you
want, I mean . . .
K: I know, but . . .
P: We're going to play that by
ear. It may be 30 minutes, if I decide it. I'm not saying to play it by the
goddamn television. But, you know what I mean. We'll talk about
K: That's right.
P: Let me ask you about a
couple other things. Of course, they can only use a couple minutes in the
program but we have got to give them enough, then they'll pick the good things.
What is the situation now with
K: Well, he's content not to
be-not to have gone on television announcing the thing./4/
/4/ Reference is to the
initiative Bush was instructed to take cited in footnote 2 above.
P: That wouldn't have been any
good at all because we're not sure it's going to work.
K: No, but it would [not] have
been good for him to set up a command post in
P: And working with the
Chinese because they wouldn't understand him at all.
K: That's right and that's
what the . . . oh, not at all . . . and the Chinese are in any case programmed.
They don't want to be involved in our . . . They want to be able to say that
they are not colluding with us.
P: I see.
K: So
P: You mean Sisco did.
K: Sisco
did.
P: Oh, that's what did it?
K: Yes.
P: Now Ziegler made a very
good public statement, huh? What was Ziegler's statement?
K: Well, Ziegler's statement
said the President has been following this hourly. At
P: Now how did Sisco handle it? Did he do what you told him that I told
him he was to do this?
K: Exactly. Well, at first he
didn't want to do it and
P: Is that what did it?
K: Yes. Which
is OK. We don't want them to . . .
P: Of course, you got the
Ziegler played, that was very good.
K: Right.
P: And then Sisco did give a good backgrounder?
K: He did give a good
backgrounder citing chapter and verse of all the things the Indians have
refused to do: no UN observers, no acceptance of the . . .
P: Did he also cite what we
have done-that we have given $250 million in aid and all that.
K: Oh yes, oh yes.
P: We're getting all that
across, are we?
K: Yes, and anything that
needs to be done I can do Monday morning.
P: I think what probably needs
to be done, that Monday you may have to give-basically, rather than having a
white paper put out; that what you ought to do is look over the facts very,
very carefully and then go out and give a hard hitting briefing.
K: Yes, but I ought to do that
on background.
P: Oh absolutely, on
background. On the thing that we've just talked to the President, we've
examined the whole thing, now here are the facts. I think that could have an
enormous effect.
K: Right. I think that's
right.
P: It would pit world opinion
against these people.
K: Right.
P: Is that the way you feel
about it?
K: That's exactly the way I
feel about it. Because that puts us-then we have to have a basis for the
actions in the economic field we are taking.
P: Now insofar as those
actions are concerned, we haven't had any squeals from the Indians, have we?
K: No, no. See that's again
where State was wrong. The Indians have no interest in escalating this with us.
Not a squeal. They will start squealing next week when the economic aid is cut
off.
P: Now understand, I don't want any nonsense about this. I really want it cut
down to-anything that can be cut is got to be cut next week. Anything that can
be cut and I want Hannah brought on the carpet. And I want Currans
and everybody-so that everything is cut, Henry. That's the only way the Indians
are going to understand this-if it all is cut and they know it. Don't announce
a thing. Just do it.
K: Exactly.
P: Now is that all understood.
K: That's all understood, Mr.
President.
P: And Connally
understands it, of course.
K: Connally
has played beautiful ball. He knows how to do these things without the knife
showing.
P: Incidentally, tell him, if
you will-now he's at the gridiron tonight-but in the morning, if he has an
opportunity to stick the knife in
K: OK.
P: That would be a good thing
to have done.
K: Because he could do it from a development point of view.
P: That's right. That's right.
That we are going to have to reexamine our aid. I mean I think we should play a
very tough game.
I don't think the American
people want to aid a country that is an aggressor.
K: Well, and as consistently.
It was bad enough when, with our money, they dragged us around in the UN, when
have these bastards ever supported us?
P: Never.
K: What can they do to us that
they aren't doing now? I mean if they want to be Russian stooges and have the
Russians spend a billion dollars there a year, we can't prevent it.
P: Right. Ok. Well, this is
the way to play it. We'll take a look Monday to see whether we want to have you
go.
[Omitted here is discussion
unrelated to
P: Well, I wish there was some
more we could do here but . . . They'll run out of gas-both sides-won't they in
about two weeks.
K: Yes, but of course, another
thing we have done is to send a backchannel to the Shah from you saying that,
trying to find out whether he wanted to give some support to Pakistan and
saying if he did we would look to see whether we could find a way of letting,
of replacing his . . .
P: Are you sure that
backchannel is safe?
K: Yes.
P: I wouldn't do it through
MacArthur./5/
/5/
Ambassador to Iran Douglas MacArthur II.
K: No, no, that's why I didn't
do it that way and we didn't put it as a message. We put it as talking points so
it can be disallowed.
P: Good, well we'll have some
fun with this yet. God, you know what would really be poetic justice here is if
some way the Paks could really give the Indians a
bloody nose for a couple of days. The fighting, any report on that?
K: Well, the fighting-we got
reports in
P: How about
K: In
P: Isn't that awful. That [is]
terrible. The Indians are bombing
K: Yes.
P: Oh, for Christ's sake,
isn't that . . . and
K: Yes. Well, of course,
they've been playing a terrific game these last years. Every time one tank was
shipped to Pakistan the Indians would carry on like maniacs, but they've been
getting big shipments from India [the Soviet Union?], they've been getting big
shipments from India [the Soviet Union?], rather [than] their own armaments
industry.
P: Well, we've got to get
across the point that as far as our aid to
K: That's right. Oh, the
military aid thing, Mr. President, is so absurd. We gave $3.8 million dollars
worth of spare parts.
P: As I look at this thing for
the future, Henry, I have the feeling that they're going to try to build it
up-again we've got to think of what the media will try to do.
P: Let the Indians squeal. Let
the liberals squeal. What's wrong with that?
K: Well, uh . . .
P: I'm not sure, you know, that we may not be playing it boldly enough.
K: Well, we can look at that.
On Monday morning we can . . .
P: I want to see that kind of a
suggestion because I would be prepared to go out and say in view of this action
that we regretfully cut off. Until this action desists all economic aid to
K: That's right and you said
that's what you'd do.
P: I think we ought to do it.
K: Well, we can certainly, Mr.
President, on Monday morning cut off this $100 million dollar slice.
P: Well, but you see all this
is salami stuff. I think that what is really needed is a jolt. We have given
$10 billion worth of aid to
K: OK.
P: All right, we've got $10
billion and we're cutting off all aid to
K: Right.
P: Don't you agree?
K: I think that . . . no, I'm
very-I find it very attractive. Our experience has been . . .
P: It'll be very attractive
also to the American people.
K: That's right.
P: They would like it. You
say, "Look, we've given $10 billion in aid. Now they are going forward
with this aggression, we're cutting off all aid to them until they stop."
K: And evacuate any territory
they have occupied.
P: That's right. Well, get me
a plan like that and I'll go for it, okay?
K: Right, Mr. President.
P: All right.
Source: Document 223, volume XI,