Secret
White
House
National
Security Council
Memorandum
for the President
From:
Henry A. Kissinger
Subject:
Background on Cutting off
In
a more general memo, I have discussed the choice that remains to you in making
the final decision on cutting the military supply pipeline for
Option
1: Stop Issuing New Licenses
This
move would cut off the following items which are known to be under contract but
for which no licenses have yet been issued:
-- $13 million in radar communications equipment for
the early warning radar system the US provided to India following China's 1962
attack.
-- $4 million in C-119 spares which would virtually
ground India's 62 C-119s which form a major part of its transport fleet.
--There is also a small amount ($70,000) known to be
contracted under FMS cash sales.
-- In addition to the above, there is an indefinite
amount of future purchases that are probably in the works one way or another
but so far without a formal contract let or license required.
One
example is the fact that $4 million remains in a line of credit for the radar
communications equipment in addition to the $13 million listed above. A second
example is that there are license applications pending for $3.6 million in
commercial sales, but we do not know whether they represent a supplier applying
for a license in anticipation of a sale or a fairly firm order without a final
contract.
In
short: Stopping the issuance of new licenses would cut off at least $17 million
in material known to be under contract and would also
stop
a large portion of another $8 million known to be planned one way or another.
Option
1 would allow the flow of the following:
--$5.3 million in already licensed equipment known
to be under contract. This consists of the following major items: tools for
production of 75 mm and 105 mm cartridge cases, cartridge cases for 106 mm
ammunition, spares for aircraft (largely transport and helicopters), electronic
countermeasures sets with spares and machinery of 7.62 mm ammunition. The
purchase of ammunition components is an ongoing program so is significant.
-- $8.2 million in licenses issued for which
contracts are not known to have been signed, although they may have been. This
is mainly for inertial guidance systems for use in civil aircraft (707s), and
for some sonar equipment for naval use.
In
short: Revoking all licenses would cut off a maximum of $13.5 million in
outstanding licenses. It is certain that $5.3 million of this
is
under contract and likely that at least half of the remainder is.
Option
2: Revoke Outstanding Licenses
This step would cut off in addition the $13.5
million in material that would have been left flowing by Option 1. This is the
equipment described in the last paragraph above. The most significant program
affected by this step would be the ongoing supply of ammunition components.
The Indians buy components and complete assembly in India.
The
principal arguments for Option 1 are:
-- It would maintain parallelism with the procedures
followed in the Pakistan case. The first step was to suspend issuance of new
licenses and renewal of expired licenses. Parallelism would provide defense
against the charge that we are out to get the Indians.
-- It would leave for a time something of an ongoing
program. This would make it a little easier to reopen a program in the future.
Total embargoes once imposed are hard to get out of with the Congress.
-- It would leave one more step to take later.
Nevertheless
Option 1 is a substantial step, touching as it does two major programs and a
minimum of $17 million in equipment and a potential of another $8 million.
The
principal arguments in Option 2 are:
-- Option 1 will make the Indians as angry as Option
2. If we are going to take a strong step rather than just send a small signal,
we might as well go all the way as four-fifths of the way.
-- For those who would favor being tough on India or
even for those who oppose military supply in general, it would be difficult to
explain why we allow ammunition components to keep moving
One
other issue of timing needs to be considered. If the UN Security Council were
to meet, there might be some advantage in waiting to act under cover of
Security Council action. On the other hand, that is probably still a few days
in the future if it happens at all.
Source: