Secret telegram
25
November 1971
From: Amconsul Calcutta
To: Secretary State Washington DC
Sub: Bangladesh Contacts
1. Summary: Qaiyum made "urgent" call on
Poloff November 24 to say at entire BD Cabinet left for New Delhi November 22. Qaiyum did not
rpt not know purpose of trip, but speculated GOI-BDG agreement imminent,
perhaps on recognition of BD. He quoted BD leaders and Indians as saying that
only rpt only release of Mujib would prevent Indo-Pak war. He said they
believed if Mukti Bahini successes continued at present rate, Paks would be
forced to declare war. He emphasised that BD leadership still thinks USG has
only effective "lever" to push Yahya to free Sheikh. He commented on
recent MB thrusts and overall strategy, denying that Indians doing most of
fighting and claiming GOI has given M$ almost everything it desired in way of
arms. End summary.
2. Qaiyum called on Political Officer evening
November 24, saying he had urgent matter to discuss. He said he had tried
unsuccessfully to reach Poloff previous day to tell him entire BD Cabinet left
for New Delhi afternoon of November 22. Although he did not rpt
not know purpose of leaders' trip, he said it believed by other Awami League
members that GOI and BDG about to reach some sort of agreement, perhaps on
recognition. He noted that MEA policy planning chairman D.P. Dhar was in
Calcutta November 21 and may have
accompanied group to capital. (Comment: We have heard from other sources that
Dhar was here on that date and that BDG had been holding intense internal
sessions - without Dhar for once.)
3. Qaiyum said that during recent days many BDG
leaders (he named "Acting President" Islam, "Fonmin"
Mushtaq and "Roving Ambassador" M.A. Samad) had been insisting that
if rpt if Mujib were released, BD reps would be willing to talk to GOP
anywhere about full range of issues. (French Consul General tells us he heard
similar story from BD "Ambassador at large" Abdul Fateh.) Qaiyum said
they had all agreed that if Mujib not released, Indo-Pak war is inescapable;
if he is freed, situation would cool at once. They still believe USG is only
government with effective "lever" in its hands which might push Yahya
to free Mujib. They hope USG is still trying to use that "lever"
before it too late. They argued that, if Mukti Bahini victories in east
continued at present rate, Paks would be forced to declare war on India.
4. Turning to specific military actions, Qaiyum said
"war has already started on this side," and claimed MB had
"liberated" great deal of territory. He believed MB tactics were to
surround Pak troop contingents and wipe them out or drive them out. After
that, Indian army could come in if it wanted to provide artillery support for
next MB attack. He claimed MB shelling Jessore November 24 with artillery it
received from Indian army, that MB controlled almost all of Jessore district
except for cantonment and center of town, that MB has "captured"
Jessore-Khulna road, and that if Jessore falls, Khulna will follow shortly. In
eastern sector, he though MB would take control of Akhaura during night
(November 24-25), cutting off last access to Sylhet He believed major thrusts
would be directed toward Sylhet and Kushtia in next day or two. He said
Dacca had been placed under
curfew November 24. He denied that India army doing most of fighting
"inside Bangladesh" saying, "we do
not want Indian army in our country any more than we want Pak army." He
allowed that Indian army might venture into east behind MB, since there would
then be no Pak army to keep them out.
Gordon
Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim
and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 405 - 406