Foreign Relations, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Documents on
South Asia, 1969-1972
Released by
the Office of the Historian
TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
K: I
just wanted to tell you we had a call here from Brandt to the President which
we thought concerned the meeting. But the President doesn't want to talk
because doesn't want to get involved in scheduling of announcements. But
it was about India/Pakistan. He asked what the
attitude would be. I will send you a memo. I said we will ask for restraint. He
asked about the UN and I said if it went to the UN we would urge lend of
military operations and opportunity for refugees to return. Drawn
from the cable.
R:
Can't beat that. What is he going to do?
K: He
agreed with that. I said it wouldn't hurt that if people who are friendly with
R: If
it continues to build and I think it will then exhortations will not help and
the UN is the only way out.
K:
Let's not kid ourselves -- that means
R:
They will if the fighting doesn't stop.
K:
R: I
think in the UN
K: I
am in favor of going to the UN if it continues another day.
R: We don't do it.
K: No
someone else.
R: I
think we have positioned ourselves well. We have
asked restraint on both sides and humanitarian assistance. Yahya's
position is more tenable then Mrs. Gandhi. She doesn't want UN or observers or
a representative group. Yahya does. So he has quite
an advantage and I see no way out for him but that.
K:
It's part of the Soviet strategy to humiliate the country that helped the UN
and
R: And
it looks like they will succeed.
K: I
think we should cut off military pipe line.
Rogers/Kissinger
R:
It's not substantial. The principle reason it continues is the intelligence
facilities we thought it was important. ? ? ? ? ? ? over
a period of time. If we decide it's of no consequence we will break ties with
K: I
don't have a staff paper. Could we get recommendations?
R:
It's so small it doesn't have significance except symbolic. I think we should
be sure to stay out of it. Get someone else to stop fighting and its going on
in 3 places now and fairly substantial. Brandt going to talk
with the President?
K: No.
I think he did it as a grandstand play. I wasn't prepared for this subject. I
thought he would bitch about the separate announcement.
R:
Have you talked with the German Ambassador?
K: No.
R:
Maybe I should call him in and say Brandt called the President and touch base
with him.
K: I
think there's a shade of difference between State's and the President's view.
He would like to tilt towards
R: I
don't see that. I don't think it's right. Does he
think that?
K: No
because I didn't go into it with him. He wants tough cables to go out. I
haven't gone into that because it's not my job to make difficulties. But he
told them in a WSAG meeting 3 months ago what he thought.
R: We
all favor
K:
Question all along we are lax if we tell
which or if we give humanitarian or they want military things.
R:
They don't rely on us for military things.
K: No but ? ? ? ? .
R: Is
that what the President wants?
K: No,
not for a couple of days.
Rogers/Kissinger
R: I
don't think it serves the President well. I don't think we should say the
President wants us to kick
K: If
one is asked what to do then one says release Mujib.
That's what
R: Who
said that? Did we?
K: I
don't want to go into it. It's a speech that was made yesterday. R: It's not
what we have urged.
K: I
thought this morning we were together. No disagreement this morning.
R: I
think we should talk with the President about it. If there's any difference of
opinion then he should know about it but I don't think so.
K: I
think we are substantially in accord. It's a question of nuance and if ? ? ? its telling
R: I
don't think we should try to settle it politically or militarjly.
We can
cut off economic assistance to
K: It
shouldn't be done until after the extent of fighting is known.
R: I
think perhaps we should get together with the President so he knows what my
position is. I will call the President.
Source: Document 155, E - 7,