Minutes
of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting/1/
/1/ Source:
National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional
Files (H-Files), Box H-115, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top
Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. No drafting appears on the minutes. The
meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the
meeting, prepared by James Noyes (OASD/ISA) is in the
SUBJECT
PARTICIPANTS
Chairman-Henry A. Kissinger
State
John N. Irwin, II
David Schneider
Christopher Van Hollen
Bruce Laingen
Samuel DePalma
Defense
David Packard
Armistead Selden
James H. Noyes
JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Capt. Howard N. Kay
CIA
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
John Waller
AID
Donald MacDonald
NSC Staff
Harold H. Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
R/Adm. Robert O. Welander
Jeanne W. Davis
SUMMARY OF
CONCLUSIONS
It was
agreed that:
1)
Telegrams, as revised at the meeting, should be sent to Ambassadors Farland, Keating and Beam instructing them to make démarches to the respective Foreign Ministers expressing
our concern and urging restraint;
2) State
will do a memorandum on a cutoff of aid;
3) A
proposed scenario for UN action and a draft SC resolution will be sent for
comment to USUN and Embassies Islamabad and
Mr. Kissinger: (to Cushman) Where do we stand?
(General
Cushman briefed from the attached text.)/2/
/2/ General
Cushman summarized reports of the fighting occurring along the border between
East Pakistan and
Mr. Irwin:
How long does it take to get some feedback [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]?
Gen.
Cushman: We should get it within a day.
Mr. Packard:
Do we have pretty good coverage there?
Gen.
Cushman: [2 lines of source text not declassified]
Mr.
Kissinger: Does it look as though this is a limited operation or will they keep
going?
Gen.
Cushman: They have the option of stopping it or of throwing more in. It looks
like a limited operation to us.
Mr. Irwin:
The cable/3/ says that there are spearheads directed against Chalma and
/3/
Reference is to telegram 11557 from
Gen.
Cushman: They have the capability.
Adm. Moorer: Do you have anything on the Indian Navy-there were reports that they had fired on a British ship.
Gen.
Cushman: We have nothing on that.
Mr.
Kissinger: (to Irwin) What do you think?
Mr. Irwin:
We have nothing to add. General Cushman summarized what we have in the cables.
Mr.
Kissinger: We have received a letter from Yahya./4/ It doesn't add anything.
(Copies of the letter had been given to Under Secretary Irwin and Mr. Van Hollen at the table.)
/4/
President Yahya's undated letter to President Nixon,
which was delivered to the White House by the Pakistani Embassy on November 23,
provided a detailed account of what Yahya described
as unprovoked, large-scale Indian attacks into
Mr. Van Hollen: The first point is a repeat of what Additional
Foreign Secretary Alvie told Ambassador Farland. The rest is an appeal for help.
Mr.
Kissinger: Has everyone seen the three draft cables (to
/5/ Copies
of these draft telegrams were sent to Haig on
November 22 under cover of a memorandum from R.T. Curran, Deputy Executive
Secretary of the Department. (Ibid., Nixon
Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box
H-082, Senior WSAG Meeting,
Mr.
Saunders: Yes, they have them at the table.
Mr.
Kissinger: The President asked for three cables last night-to the Soviets, the
Indians and the Pakistanis. I talked to Secretary Rogers last night to confirm
that the cables would not be sent until they had been considered at this
meeting. The cables were very well done, but the President wanted to add some
reference to his conversation with Mrs. Gandhi. He told her we were sympathetic
on the refugee situation but that a resort to war "simply would not be
understood." I have written in a sentence on page three of the draft cable
to
Mr. Irwin:
The question is whether we should send these cables out now or wait for more
independent confirmation of what has happened. If we do send them now, should
we refer to "Indian armed forces" or should we generalize? Also, if
we send the cables now, might it be better to make the démarche
at the Foreign Minister level, saving an approach to Yahya
and Mrs. Gandhi for later when we will know more.
Mr. Kissinger:
What more do we have to know?
Mr. Irwin:
We could use better confirmation of what forces are involved from some external
source.
Mr.
Kissinger: (to Irwin) What do you think?
Mr. Irwin:
If we send them now, I think we should phrase them so as not to appear to be
automatically accepting the reports as fact. Also I think it would be good to
go in at the Foreign Minister level-to Swaran Singh.
Then we could be prepared to go tomorrow, or whenever we have more information,
to the Prime Minister. This would give us a double push.
Mr.
Kissinger: Would you change the text for an approach to the Foreign Minister or
keep it the same?
Mr. Irwin:
Essentially the same.
Mr.
Kissinger: (to Packard) What do you think?
Mr. Packard:
I think it's probably just as good to indicate our serious concern by going
right to the
top, but I don't feel strongly about it.
Mr. Irwin: I
would fuzz the second line on page 2 of the telegram to
Mr. Packard:
I would also take out the sentence on page one which says: "GOP has
characterized these most recent incidents as 'all out' Indian offensive against
Mr. Irwin:
If we're going to refer to the President, we should probably go to the Prime
Minister rather than the Foreign Minister. My choice would be to go to the
Foreign Minister first then, when we learn more, go to the Prime Minister.
Mr.
Kissinger: We can mention the President to the Foreign Minister, can't we? Is
there anything wrong with that?
Adm. Moorer: If we go to the Foreign Minister and the action
escalates drastically meanwhile, there would be no point in talking to Mrs.
Gandhi about starting a war. It would be a fait accompli, and we should be
talking about withdrawing rather than withholding. Personally I think there's
no question that Indian regular forces are involved.
Mr.
Kissinger: There is no way guerrillas could get tanks and aircraft and be
operating in brigade formation. We can play this charade only so long. What
kind of a world is it where countries can claim these are guerrilla actions? It
doesn't make sense, and we certainly don't have to play along. I have no strong
view about whether to approach the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister
first. Should I ask the President about this?
Mr. Packard:
We should also be thinking carefully about the next step if the situation
escalates.
Mr.
Kissinger: I know what the President will do-he will
cut off aid. (to MacDonald) Can we operate on the
basis of the paper/6/ you did as part of the contingency planning, or will we
need something else?
/6/
Reference is to a paper prepared on November 2 in AID/NESA/SA entitled
"A.I.D. Actions During First 96 Hours Following
Decision to Terminate Aid." The paper was summarized on November 23 by
Saunders and Hoskinson in a briefing memorandum
prepared as background for that day's WSAG meeting. The four steps in the
proposed process of terminating economic assistance to
Mr.
MacDonald: You can operate on the basis of our paper.
Mr. Kissinger: What would we do-take the first two steps?
Mr.
MacDonald: We would propose taking the first four steps: (1) announce a cutoff
of economic assistance to India or Pakistan or both; (2) freeze all action on
pending obligations and agreements; (3) instruct U.S. banks not to issue new
letters of credit against outstanding letters of commitment balances-this
amounts to about $100 million; (4) ask U.S. banks informally not to make
disbursements against outstanding lines of credit without checking with AID.
Mr.
Kissinger: At what point would we take these steps?
Mr.
MacDonald: I defer to State on that.
Mr. Irwin:
That's uncertain. We think we should wait until we know more.
Mr. Packard:
We could send them the warning to slow up. If they don't, we could take the aid
cutoff steps.
Mr.
Kissinger: I agree, we certainly won't do it today.
Who would be hurt more by an aid cutoff-India or
Mr. Van Hollen: In the short term, neither country would be hurt
very much. There would be an important political and psychological impact, but
very little economic effect. There's still a large pipeline to both countries.
Mr.
Kissinger: Can we cut off the pipeline?
Mr.
MacDonald: Any aid cutoff would have only a marginal effect. It would be
possible to cut off the pipeline, but it's an extremely complicated process and
would take some time. They have funds in 39 commercial and investment banks,
and lines of credit are in the hands of thousands of suppliers.
Mr.
Kissinger: The effect of the cutoff would be felt in what time period?
Mr.
MacDonald: It would take about a month to get the instructions out.
Mr.
Kissinger: When would
Mr.
MacDonald: In about three months.
Mr.
Kissinger: Who would be hurt more-India or
Mr.
MacDonald: It's marginal, but probably
Mr. Packard:
What would you do about the aid to the refugees?
Mr.
MacDonald: That is mostly food and could be handled separately-it will be
complicated, though.
Mr.
Kissinger: Could we cut off aid to
Mr. Van Hollen: Yes, we can do it to either or to both.
Mr. Irwin:
If we cut off aid because of an invasion of East Pakistan, I question whether
we should cut off aid to
Mr. Packard:
Does refugee aid go to
Mr.
MacDonald: It goes to both countries.
Mr. Van Hollen: I think there is a question of whether it would be
in the
Mr. Kissinger:
Unless India felt that they would begin to hurt in a month or two and this had
a restraining effect on them. Could we stop all shipments?
Mr.
MacDonald: The U.S. Government would have to take title to all goods that are
now under Indian and Pakistani title. We have the right to do this under our
agreements, since we are loaning them the money to buy these goods. But it
would create chaos in the commercial world and probably involve years of
litigation if we should try to cancel the pipeline.
Mr. Kissinger:
How much is involved?
Mr.
MacDonald: For India, some $224 million. One quarter to one-fifth is on the
high seas, about half in
Mr. Van Hollen: Unless we have unequivocal evidence of an all-out
Indian attack on
Mr.
MacDonald: The empirical evidence is that a cancellation of aid tends to lessen
our influence rather than enhance it.
Dr.
Kissinger: But granting the aid hasn't helped us. I understand your argument,
but I don't see how a cut-off of aid could lessen our influence.
Mr. Selden:
There's also some military aid going to
Dr.
Kissinger: Can we get our pipeline experts to work on this?
Mr. Van Hollen: There is a memorandum from the Secretary/7/ coming
over. There is about $5.2 million in the pipeline.
/7/ Not found.
Adm. Moorer: We're in a helluva fix.
We're scattering aid all over the world where it isn't doing us any good, then when we try to cut it off we're told it would be
counterproductive.
Dr.
Kissinger: And we're getting nothing for it. It's not right to have military
aid going to
Mr. Van Hollen: We have a memo from the Secretary to the President
on this in train.
Dr.
Kissinger: Can we get it today?
Adm. Moorer: What do you mean by an all-out attack? How about a
little attack? How much of an attack are we talking about?
Mr. Van Hollen: I agree the situation is complicated, but the
Indians are publicly denying that their regular forces are involved. It's a
question of the effect of an aid cut-off on our ability to get the Indians to
exercise restraint.
Adm. Moorer: Should we wait for the Indians to admit it?
Mr. Irwin:
We should wait for outside information.
Dr.
Kissinger: What would be outside information?
Mr. DePalma: They haven't captured any Indian troops yet.
Mr. Van Hollen: The Indians claim they have captured some Pakistani
pilots, and the Pakistanis claim to have captured a few regular Indian
soldiers.
Dr.
Kissinger: It doesn't make sense. You have 12 planes against 200. It's the
Germans claiming they were attacked by the Lithuanians. If, for cynical
reasons, we want to play this game, all right. But let's not pretend to believe
it.
Mr. Packard:
I think it's okay to send the telegrams because they
will not be public. But we should think twice about taking a public action,
such as an aid cut-off, that may do no damned good. It won't look very good for
us to take a step that is ineffectual.
Dr.
Kissinger: I didn't hear the same arguments about cutting off the military
pipeline to
Mr. Van Hollen: The rationale for this action, which was taken in
consultation with
Mr. Packard:
I would have no objection to cutting military aid to
Dr.
Kissinger: Can we get the paper on this?
Mr. Van Hollen: Yes.
Dr.
Kissinger: It's very difficult not to cut aid to
Mr. Irwin:
There would be a symbolic impact, but not a practical one. I'm hesitant about
involving the President unless we have external confirmation of the
attack-prisoners, dead bodies, [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] etc. But there would be no harm in going with the cables to the
Prime Minister, as long as they were phrased as a démarche
from the U.S. Government to their Government.
Dr.
Kissinger: These are not messages from the President. It is merely the U.S.
Government quoting a phrase from the President. They aren't Presidential
letters.
Mr. Irwin:
The President could always enter individually later on.
Mr. Selden:
How about the cable to the UN? Shouldn't we let someone else take the
initiative?
Mr. Irwin:
We think we should send the cable to USUN to get some reaction.
Dr.
Kissinger: We could live with this resolution (contained in the draft telegram
to USUN)./8/ It's a good cable; I have no problem with it. Let's get the views
on the UN approach, then meet again. Does anyone have
any problem with this?
/8/
Reference is to a draft telegram sent to Haig on
November 22 under cover of a memorandum from Curran. (National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box
H-082, Senior WSAG Meeting,
Mr. Irwin:
We want to show the telegram to the Secretary. He hasn't seen it yet.
Mr. Van Hollen: If the Pakistanis are determined to go to the
Security Council, there is a question as to whether we shouldn't approach the
Secretary General or a third party to try to have the call for an SC meeting
come from somewhere else. We might get a more balanced outcome if the call did
not come from
Dr.
Kissinger: You might have a less acrimonious debate, but I don't think you'll
have a good outcome.
Mr. Packard:
We should not take the initiative.
Mr. Irwin:
We prefer the Secretary General or some smaller powers take the lead.
Mr. Van Hollen: We would have to put the Secretary General up to
it.
Mr. Irwin:
And he is ill.
Dr.
Kissinger: Doesn't someone substitute for him?
Mr. DePalma: This would be a very daring move for a substitute
to take.
Dr.
Kissinger: We're not approaching anyone else yet, are we?
Mr. Irwin:
No.
Dr.
Kissinger: Let's send the cables as we have revised them here. The President
has already asked me if the cables have gone and if they were tough. I couldn't
satisfy him on either count.
(9:50-Mr. Kissinger left the room.)
Mr. Irwin:
(to Gen. Cushman) What are our chances on getting
further information?
Gen.
Cushman: We're getting more information but I can't say when we'll have proof
of Indian involvement. The fact that the Pakistanis admit they have lost tanks,
which they do not normally do, indicates that the Indians must be operating
there.
Mr. Van Hollen: Is there any way of closing the [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] time gap?
Mr. Waller:
[2 lines of source text not declassified]
Mr. Van Hollen: [11/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Mr. Waller:
[1 line of source text not declassified]
Mr. Irwin:
(to Gen. Cushman) What is the one you have?
Gen.
Cushman: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reporting damage to
the Jessore airfield [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified]
Mr. Irwin:
Are they within range of the border?
Gen.
Cushman: [31/2 lines of source text not declassified]
(9:58-Dr. Kissinger returned.)
Mr. Irwin:
We will get all four of the cables out. At what level should we go in?
Dr.
Kissinger: What is the consensus?
Mr. Packard:
I think we should go right to the top to emphasize our concern. But we should
also begin to think about the next steps.
Dr.
Kissinger: We should cut off the military pipeline.
Mr. Irwin:
My inclination would be, until we have firm confirmation of the attack, to go
to the Foreign Minister and then escalate to the Prime Minister, but I have no
strong feeling.
Mr. Packard:
It might be better to start at the lower level.
Dr.
Kissinger: OK, but let's get the telegrams out within the hour.
Mr. Van Hollen: We have the same problem, with cutting off the
pipeline, of the impact on
Dr.
Kissinger: I'm only talking about the military pipeline.
Source: Document 196, volume XI,