Secret telegram

22 November 1971

From: Amembassy New Delhi

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Subject: UN Role in East Pakistan Problem

 

1. We interpret Prime Minister Gandhi's reply to UN Secretary Gen­eral as (A) polite, firm rejection of international mediation between India and Pakistan, (B) renewed appeal for international pressure on GOP to move toward political settlement and (C) deferred consid­eration of subsequent international facilitative role in implementation of eventual settlement. This interpretation is consistent with the GOI strategy of pressure, which is rooted in domestic compulsions and is designed to accelerate a transformation of attitude, policy, possibly of leadership and if necessary of government in Pakistan (New Delhi 16911).

 

2. The GOI seeks less to defuse tensions per se than to use them to force the GOP toward a meaningful settlement. The GOI rejects President Yahya's Cosmetic qte power transfer unqte blueprint it re­sists delaying and diversionary international initiatives and it accepts the risk of' Pakistani military reaction in force. On the Indian side the greatest danger of further military escalation lies in an apparent GOI impression that crisis resolution under current conditions of relative Indian restraint may prove unacceptably prolonged.

 

3. We perceive no rpt no indications including those cited reftel of significant moderation in GO] perspective. On contrary recent evi­dences of' sustained Bengali alienation increasing Mukti Bahini ef­fectiveness continuing refugee influx and emerging West Pakistani political and economic strains probably work to confirm GOI in firm policy. Any event we interpret GOI response re presidential panel on South Asian relief more as reaffirmation of firmness than sign of flexibility (e.g. Foreign Minister's statement November 19 reported New Delhi 18035).

 

4. With situation increasingly dynamic and critical decision still pending our considered judgement is that only a clear signal of irre­versible GOP movement toward basic political settlement could really moderate GOI and Bangladesh views at this late stage. While an early total solution is unrealistic irrevocable progress in that di­rection seems indispensable. For this reason Mujibur Rahman has critical symbolic significance and UN good offices potential would be enhanced if the SYG could contribute to Mujib's release.

 

5. In light of above the most promising formula for terms of refer­ence for SYG good offices as proposed reftel would be along lines para 4C with mission to East Pakistan followed by consultation in Islamabad and New Delhi in that order.

 

(A) Provided mission were quietly and expediently proposed without association as is suggested, and (B) particularly if pro­posal were accompanied by private assurances of SYG inten­tion to promote dialogue with Mujib. Even so GOI might prove unresponsive on basis (A) facts of situation in East Paki­stan already are well known to world, certainly to India and (B) basic problem is between East and West Pakistan and its solution lies in effecting change of policy in Islamabad.

 

6. Formulas proposed reftel paras 4A and D would likely get mired in basic Indian objection to equation of India and Pakistan and to implication that current crisis is essentially Indo-Pakistani affair. Similar objection would apply to formula in para 4B and be exacer­bated by implied introduction of Kashmir issue in form of proposed consultations with chief military observer UNMOGI-.

 

7. Formula likely to have best prospects with GOI would variation of Para 4C which envisaged mission to East Pakistan and Islamabad only, with possible subsequent visit to New Delhi held open pending results in Pakistan.

 

8. Meanwhile there may be merit in GOP moving to expedite the de­parture of its current High Commissioner in New Delhi and to re­place him rapidly with someone able to promote an Indo-Pakistani diplomatic dialogue here. Pak High Commissiontr Hyder informed DCCM November 22 he did not expect to depart before January for his new post in Turkey.

 

Keating

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 385 - 387