Secret telegram

November 22, 1971

From: Amconsul Calcutta

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Subject: Bangladesh contacts

 

1. Summary: Qaiyum called on Political Officer November 21 to make renewed plea that USG work on Yahya to release Mujib. He said if Sheikh not released soon, communists would wrest BD lead­ership from moderates, which not in interest of BD, GOP, GOI or USG. Release, even if Sheikh restricted to West Pakistan, would cool situation considerably and allow peaceful solution to be found, since only Mujib has power to provide Yahya with face-saving way out of crisis. Qaiyum claimed that 301 worried about leftist takeover and would like see confederation solution. He suggested that it in best interest of Pakistan for Yahya to step down and hand over power to another military figure saying Yahya "has no right to destroy both parts of Pakistan." Qaiyum warned that time is running out for GOP leadership. Mukti Bahini increasingly successful, getting "all help" from India, and BD leaders expect military victory in east within next two months. End summary.

 

2. After hiatus of one month (reftel), Qaiyum called on Poloff No­vember 21. When Poloff expressed surprise and recalled stories in press that BD men were forbidden to see foreign diplomats (see Cal­cutta 2723), Qaiyum said stories were erroneous, and added that he expected no rpt no trouble from BDG, Awami League or GOI for having seen Poloff again. However, he later remarked that he did not care what anyone said about this contact and he would continue to visit Poloff if and when he so desired.

 

3. Qaiyum said he had come to see Poloff because he had an urgent and vital request to make, i.e. that USG redouble its efforts to con­vince Yahya to free Sheikh Mujib. He said he realized USG had made efforts in past with Yahya, but as far as he could tell, efforts

had produced naught. He asked if Poloff knew present status of Sheikh, and was told that, as far as Poloff aware, Mujib still alive and under trial. Qaiyum said that if Sheikh were released, "heat will be off." He said that even if Mujib were confined to West Pakistan after release, crisis would cool and "many of us" would try to go and talk to Sheikh. He noted that Newsweek senior editor De Borchgrave in talking to BD "Acting President" Nazrul Islam on November 19(see Calcutta 2869) had argued that Yahya needed face-saving exit from current impasse, and said, "only Sheikh can give Yahya his way out. Moreover, I think he would be willing to do so. Sheikh is

good politician and understands what is best for our country."

 

4. Qaiyum said he thought best solution for Pakistan would be for Yahya to emulate Ayub Khan, and go abroad for extended trip after having handed over power to another general. Saying he thought Yahya rather stupid, Qaiyum suggested that Lt-Gen Yakub Khan or Admiral Ahsan would be most acceptable to Bengalis. He did not demur when Poloff suggested those two might not be so acceptable to West Pakistanis.

 

5. Qaiyum said if Yahya cannot see that he and Pakistan are "doomed" if present course of events is allowed to continue, trip to east wing by President would convince him quickly. He said, "Yahya keeps saying things are normal there. Why should he be afraid to go?" If Yahya fears assassination, "let him send a foreigner he trusts implicitly, and let him hear what the foreigner reports". Qaiyum noted that Yahya had told De Borchgrave to go to east and travel "anywhere he liked," and that De Borchgrave's subsequent story must have shocked President, "if he read it".

 

6. Qaiyum said "Acting President" Nazrul Islam is anti-communist, as are most Awami League members, including Mujib. Moderates were coming under increasing pressure from BD leftists, Russian communists and Soviets, and "without Sheikh we cannot stand up to pressure much longer." He said that power struggle for eventual leadership of BD already underway and that leftists receiving con­siderable outside assistance, while others getting nothing. He said there many aspirants for top positions, which creating increasing dis­sension within AL, as well as between AL and other potential leaders such as MB commanders and leftists.

 

7. Qaiyum argued that Indians also worried about future leadership of BD, and especially about prospects for independent BD without Mujib, because they fear leftists would eventually gain control and that this would spill over into India, especially West Bengal. He saidthat he had recently visited New Delhi and that, while there, had concluded that GOI "probably" now would like to see formation of loose confederation of East and West Pakistan. He said he had heard that, in such eventuality, GOI would expect Sheikh to be freed so he could be part of "right-wing" government he could live with.

 

8. During current situation in east, Qaiyum said long-awaited Mukti Bahini offensive underway and highly successful. He claimed MB controlled most of countryside in many districts, including Dinajpur, Mymensingh, northern Sylhet, Comilla and Barisal. MB had not at­tempted to take major towns because they too well defended, and expected army to pull back from border into towns and cantonments in near future. He noted fresh MB drive "nearby." Actually he may have been referring to major military activity reportedly going on in Jessore district. Qaiyum said MB now has two Divisions of "regular troops", consisting in large measure of former EBR, EPR and police, and total strength of about 100,000. He said BDG expected Pak army in east to be "wiped out" in two months or less. He said MB in final push would be supported by Indian air force and acknowledged that, as of now, MB receiving "all help" from India. In response question, Qaiyum said all rpt all MB military assistance coming directly from India.

 

9. Poloff reminded Qaiyum he had asked about MB policy concern­ing attacks on United Nations' vessels and vehicles, and inquired if Qaiyum had yet been able to talk to MB "frogman" commander on subject (see Calcutta 2605). Qaiyum said that as far as he knew, BDG had formulated no rpt no policy on matter as yet. In any case, he said he had heard UN was pulling out of east.

 

10. Saying he had recently made extensive tour of border areas, Qai­yum likened situation in east to that in Vietnam and said he expected West Paks to be faced down "just like another powerful army in Southeast Asia". He again urged that USG apply maximum persua­sion to Yahya before it too late. He said USG should talk to Yahya as friend, if USG still thought that friendship in its interests, and ex­plain to Yahya consequences of continued hard line. He said end re­sult of present GOP policy would be Indo-Pak war which would also damage West Pakistan. Noting that considerable damage already done in east, Qaiyum said, "Yahya has no right to destroy both parts of Pakistan".

 

11. Other items Qaiyum noted in passing included (A) GOI may rec­ognize BD if Willy Brandt's effort with Yahya fails or is otherwise rejected by GOP; (B) Maulana Bhashani left Calcutta suddenly eve­ning November 20 for visit to New Delhi; (C) He wondered why In­dian High Commissioner to Islamabad returned to New Delhi sud­denly immediately after presenting his credentials to Yahya; (D) GOI Fonsec Kaul and other high officials are currently in Calcutta talking to BDG reps.

 

12. Comment: Qaiyum did not specify that he was talking for anyone but himself, but he clearly implied he was reflecting views of "moderates", among whom he included Nazrul Islam (comment: see Calcutta 2870) and apparently expressed concern about increased pressure from leftist wing. When taken in conjunction with his statement that GOI prefers "right-wing" BD leadership and prepared accept confederation, suggests that GOI also seriously worried about its ability prevent leftist takeover. Mujib remains key to solution.

 

Gordon

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 392 - 395