Secret Telegram

November 19,1971

From: American Embassy Islamabad

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Subject: Conversation with President Yahya

 

1. Summary: I briefed President Yahya in accordance with State 206661, concluding with observation time running out for negotia­tions and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the "key thereto". Yahya dif­fered with my position, noting that Mrs. Indira Gandhi was the key rather than Mujib. From this position Yahya expressed disinclination to permit Mujibur Rahman to designate a Bangla Desh representative who could speak on his behalf and negotiate for the Bangla Desh movement with the GOP. Said GOP would be happy to meet with Bangla Desh leaders as previously agreed to and as discussed No­vember 2. Yahya proceeded post haste with his plan for political set­tlement through promulgation constitution, convening National As­sembly on December 27, and transfer of power "several weeks" thereafter, indicated it was within province of civilian government to deal with Mujib and Bangla Desh as new government so desired. Declared his plan of action was GOP's blueprint. Yahya reaffirmed his decision to avoid war if at all possible and that he would not be institute thereof, however, if India starts war, total resources of na­tion will be dedicated to effort of survival. Noted that Mujib will be first casualty. To ease refugee problem, Yahya indicated he is con­templating asking UN to take over all facilities refugee centers in Pakistan and establish circumstances under which returning refugees would be accepted under care and protection of UN. End Summary

 

2. In accordance with reftel (state 206661), 1 met with President Ya­hya in his residence at 1800 hours Thursday, November 18. The conversation, which was wide-ranging, lasted for an hour and thirty minutes.

 

3. 1 began the conversation by drawing on state's 203187 and 203 189 for the purpose of briefing Yahya on the Gandhi visit, prefacing my remarks by conveying to him the USG's deep appreciation for his cooperation and understanding in drying up the military supply pipeline. Continuing, I noted that the conversations broke no new ground on major issues and that the Indian response to the US pres­entation was predictably reserved. Nonetheless, I noted that it did contain a degree of political flexibility which was judged as salutary and, the USG again received a reaffirmation of India's intention to exercise military restraint. I went on to observe that as a result of the discussions, it was the US belief that further movement on the politi­cal front would materially increase the hope of an early end to mili­tary confrontation. At this Juncture I stressed the fact that the Indians were told that new progress towards political settlement and reduc­tion of tensions depended heavily on the Indian willingness to be helpful. I concluded that opening comments by expressing my belief that the time was rapidly running out on the possibility of negotiation and that it appeared to most informed observers that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was very much a key in both the concept of negotiation and the hope for success thereof.

 

4. Yahya expressed the appreciation for the US efforts to lessen the tensions which daily were becoming exacerbated and said it was his sincere hope that Mrs. Gandhi had come back from her trip suffi­ciently admonished by the world leaders to prevent her from throw­ing the sub-continent into the turmoil of war, "the end result of which is just too horrible to contemplate". He then went on pointedly to differ with my observation that Mujib was the "key" in the nego­tiations. He declared that it was not Mujib who was the key to a so­lution of the current problems, it was rather Indira Gandhi who held "both the key and the lock". In explanation he noted she had "locked" the refugees in to her country by preventing their return, had trained and armed the Mukti Bahini in numbers approximately those of West Pakistan in East Pakistan, had made armed incursions into Pakistan's territory, thus pinning down the Pak army along the border and enabling the Mukti Bahini to operate in the interior.

 

5. Although realizing that the introduction of any prime subject might be less propitiously done on this occasion, judging from Yahya's afore-reported comments, I nonetheless introduced the ques­tion, is the GOP willing to consider meeting with Bangla Desh repre­sentatives designated by Mujib? I initiated this issue by recalling our conversation of November 2 during which there had been a discus­sion of the possibility of the GOP agreeing to permit Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to designate a Bangla Desh representative who could speak on his behalf and for the Bangla Desh movement, looking towards the easing of the present crisis. I said that the USG was interested in whatever thoughts he had on this subject, inasmuch as the Indians had indicated a degree of favorable interest. Yahya replied that he had considered this possibility but that he had not changed his view which he had theretofore expressed to me. His view continued to be, he said, that Mujibur no longer had the amount of political control over the Bangla Desh movement with which he was credited in for­eign circles. Further, any statement which Mujib would make pub­licly disclaiming association with the independence movement would lessen not only what authority he had left but also his credi­bility. In addition, Yahya went on to say, Mrs. Gandhi's repeated public announcements extolling the virtues of Mujibur Rahman and demanding his release had severely limited his ability to take such an action even if he so wished. "I, too, am under political pressures", he added. Yahya concluded that there was little if anything to be gained by pressuring this line of thought over my several interjected com­ments in support of an affirmative position. He said, however, that he in no way had deviated from his previous position of being willing for his government to engage in a meeting with Bangla Desh repre­sentatives as was discussed on November 2. (see paragraph 6 Is­lamabad 12927.) On the subject of meeting and negotiating, Yahya said he agreed with my observation that time had virtually run out, although he still remained amenable to the idea and hopeful of some salutary outcome. However, he added, his interest and energies were now concentrated on the political scenario which was rapidly un­folding and which would allow fruition of his earnest desire to turn the government back to the elected representatives of the people.

 

6. In answer to my question about his plans therefore and the time table that he had envisioned, Yahya told me that on the evening of December 18 he would speak to the nation outlining certain salient provisions of the constitution. These provisions would highlight the degree of "federated independence" which East Pakistan would have under it; that on December 19 the newspaper would carry an ex­tended text thereof, and on December 20 the full text would be dis­tributed in book form. Yahya then went on to say that he planned to convene the National Assembly December 27 and immediately engage in extensive talks with political leaders looking towards the formation of a civilian government and the transfer of power. In an­swer to my question as to when he envisioned this move possible, Yahya said that he felt it could be accomplished in "several weeks" after the assembly convened. Yahya then added this gratuitous com­ment; "if the civilian government then wants to deal with Bangla Desh through Mujib or otherwise, that will be the business of the ci­vilian government and of no concern to me. I will have accomplished my objective of turning the power back to the people".

 

7. Yahya then observed that, to him, it was obvious that Mrs. Gandhi and the members of her government were opposed to his plan for a political solution of the present crisis, and to his efforts to regain that degree of normalcy which would allow the refugees to return and re­sume their normal lives. Noting that the US had no blueprint in mind, he observed that his plan for reconvening the National Assem­bly was the GOP's "blueprint" and the GOP was dedicated to its con­summation. In terminating this subject, Yahya opined that once the populace in the East wing became aware of the extent of authority which the East wing will have unto itself as a result of the constitu­tion, he believed that a greater degree of support would be given his government, and that a number of the elected representatives to the assembly who had not come forward would now do so and occupy the seats to which they had been elected.

 

8. During the entire conversation it was obvious that Yahya was pre­occupied with the deteriorating law and order situation in East Paki­stan as well as his concern for the military activity along the border of East Pakistan. He referred at length to several Indian army pene­trations into Pak territory and made specific reference to incidents at Belonia. He noted that this action in itself was enough to have pre­cipitated war but that he had promised various world leaders that he would exercise the utmost restraint even under undue provocation, and this was what he was continuing to do. He hoped, however, that Mrs. Gandhi would not interpret this posture of restraint as an indi­cation of cowardice since such a miscalculation would only bring disaster to the subcontinent. Continuing this line of comment, Yahya said that while out-manned and out-gunned by a ratio of five to one, it would be foolhardy for any military leader to initiate an act of ag­gression, but, by the same token, it was most foolhardy to prod into military action a nation which had as its cause the very soul of self­survival. Yahya concluded by saying that both material and geo­graphic limitations were adverse to any military engagement, but nonetheless the people of Pakistan could be expected to fight to the fullest for a homeland for which so many sacrifices have been made, both before and after 1947. He added caustically "and Mrs. Gandhi should also note that the first casualty of her miscalculation will be Sheikh Mujibur Rahman".

 

9. On a lighter and more optimistic vein, Yahya advised me that he had received credentials from the new Indian High Commissioner, J.K. Atal, and had turned the ceremonial occasion into what he viewed as a constructive and salutary conversation; it had lasted for upwards of two hours. He said that during the conversation, which at all times was amiable and informative, he had found the viewpoints of the high commissioner to be well balanced, and that, to a degree, he appeared receptive of the Pakistan point of view. Yahya said that he had carefully explained his political plan of action (as reported aforesaid) and that Atal had indicated considerable interest. At the conclusion of the talk, High Commissioner Atal had informed him, Yahya said, that the conversation had placed a new perceptive on the Pakistani position and projected plans; consequently, he felt that the urgency of the situation necessitated an immediate return to New Delhi for the purpose of discussing the various subjects with Mrs. Gandhi. According to Yahya's understanding, the high commissioner either had left or his departure was imminent. In answer to my com­ment that this was the first solid salutary development that I had heard of here in Islamabad in the past few weeks, Yahya said that he so considered it and he hoped that this might be the beginning of de­fusing the critical situation as it now exists.

 

10. An opportunity arose whereby I floated the idea of possible ref­erendum in East Pakistan. 1 told Yahya that, based on information which he had told me about his interview with Newsweek, it ap­peared that this idea might merit consideration. He reacted that a ref­erendum was "highly unnecessary". There had been a referendum in Bengal leading to the formation of East Pakistan. A new referendum in East Pakistan would give rise to similar demands in West Paki­stan, creating serious tensions between Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier.

 

11. Before the conversation terminated, Yahya said that during the last few days he had come up with an idea which, after a little more thought, he might propose to U Thant or to Prince Sadruddin. The idea was predicated upon the pressing need to repatriate the refugees and to re-establish them in their homes and on their land. He said that what he was thinking about involved a request to the UN to send to Pakistan a large, "really large", number of UN representatives. Upon their arrival the physical facilities of all the refugee camps in East Pakistan, and more camp sites if needed, would be turned over to the UN and operated under its auspices. Yahya said he also envi­sioned that routes from the border to the camps would be opened and these ingress routes would be supervised by UN personnel to allow for the refugees' return. As he conceived it, the refugees, during the entire time they re-entered East Pakistan until the time they re­assumed permanent residence, would be under the care and protec­tion of the UN. Yahya said this was to prove the sincerity of his wel­come to all refugees and his guarantee of amnesty to them. Yahya observed that the US had supplied an airlift to move refugees from India's borders into its interior and asked: "if you can fly them into India, why couldn't you fly them home to Pakistan?" I did not answer Yahya's question, but rather observed that it was an interesting idea and that I would like to be kept advised if he planned to pursue it.

 

12. Comment: I more and more have the impression that Yahya be­lieves he is being boxed in by the numerous pressures which are be­ing exerted upon him at home and abroad. It appears to me that Ya­hya sees his political plan of action as his only means of extricating himself from an untenable military and economic situation -- a situa­tion enflamed and fueled from Indian sanctuaries and fully supported by the Indian government. With a degree of optimism, he thinks he is going to succeed in his endeavor, albeit the apparatus he is using rings singularly hollow. Hollow or not, his plan might possibly work as a means of transition, since a civilian government unbound by fetters could bridge some of the political chasms which, to Yahya, now seem impossible to bridge. In any event, war must be averted. I am convinced that Yahya will not precipitate it unless provoked to desperation, but I think it is altogether proper for me to report that 1 sensed in Yahya the first signs of agitation.

 

Farland

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 378 - 384