Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET 880
STATE 214210
47
ORIGIN SS-07
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /008 R
66611
DRAFTED BY: S/S-O K.R.PE'ITEWAY
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: C. THOMAS
………053543
0 261257 Z NOV 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN
EXDIS
FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO
FROM
SECRET
EXDIS
SUBJ : CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT YAHYA
REF : STATE 206661 AND ISLAMABAD 10927
1. SUMMARY: I briefed Pres. Yahya in accordance with State
206661, concluding with observation time running out for negotiations and
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the qte key thereto unqte. Yahya differed with my
position, noting that Mrs Indira Gandhi was the key rather than Mujib. From
this position Yahya expressed disinclination to permit Mujibur Rahman to
designate a Bangla Desh representative who could speak on his behalf and
negotiate for the Bangla Desh movement with the GOP. Said GOP would be happy to
meet with Bangla Desh leaders as previously agreed to and as discussed Nov. 2.
Yahya proceeded post-haste with his plan for political settlement through
promulgation constitution, convening National Assembly on Dec. 27, and transfer
of power qte several weeks unqte thereafter. Indicated it was within province
of civilian government to deal with Mujib and Bangla Desh as new government so
desired. Declared his plan of action was GOP's blueprint. Yahya reaffirmed his
decision to avoid war if at all possible and that he would not be institutor
thereof: however, if
facilities refugee centers in
2. In accordance with reftel (State 206661), I met
with Pres. Yahya in his residence at 1800 hrs Thursday, November 18. The
conversation, which was wideranging, lasted for an hour and thirty minutes.
3. I began the conversation by drawing on State's
203187 and 203189 for the purpose of briefing Yahya on the Gandhi visit,
prefacing my "remarks by conveying to him the USG's deep appreciation for
his cooperation and understanding in drying up the military supply pipeline.
Continuing, I noted that the conversations broke no new ground on major issues
and that the Indian response to the
4. Yahya expressed the appreciation for the U.S.
efforts to lessen the tensions which daily were becoming exacerbated and said
it was his sincere hope that Mrs Gandhi had come back from her trip
sufficiently admonished by the world leaders to prevent her from throwing the
Subcontinent into the turmoil of war, qte the end result of which is just too
horrible to contemplate unqte. He then went on pointedly to differ with my
observation that Mujib was the qte key unqte in the negotiations. He declared
that it was not Mujib who was the key to a solution of the current problems, it
was rather Indira Gandhi who held qte both the key and the lock unqte. In
explanation he noted she had qte locked unqte the refugees into her country by
preventing their return, had trained and armed the Mukti Bahini in numbers ;
approximately those of West Pakistan in East Pakistan, had made armed
incursions ; into Pakistan's territory, thus pinning down the Pak army along
the border and enabling the Mukti Bahini to operate in the interior. In answer
to my general observation that it
appeared that the law and order situation within
5. Although realizing that the introduction of any
prime subject might be less than propitiously done on this occasion, judging
from Yahya's afore-reported comments, I nonetheless introduced the question: is
the GOP willing to consider meeting with Bangla Desh representatives designated
by Mujib? I initiated this issue J by recalling our conversation of Nov 2
during which there had been a discussion of the possibility of the GOP agreeing
to permit Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to designate a Bangla Desh representative who
could speak on his behalf and for the Bangla Desh movement, looking towards the
easing of the present crisis. I said that the USG was interested in whatever
thoughts he had on this subject, inasmuch as the Indians had indicated a degree
of favorable interest. Yahya replied that he had considered this possibility
but that he had not changed his view which he had heretofore expressed to me.
His view continued to be, he said, that Mujibur no longer had the amount of
political control over the Bangla Desh movement with which he was credited in foreign
circles. Further, any statement which Mujib would make publicly disclaiming association
with the independence movement would lessen not only what authority he had left
but also his credibility. In addition, Yahya went on to say, Mrs Gandhi's
repeated public announcements extolling the virtues of Mujibur Rahman and
demanding his release had severely limited his ability to take such an action
even if he so wished. Qte I, too, am under political pressures unqte, he added.
Yahya concluded that there was little if anything to be gained by pressuring
this line of thought over my several interjected comments in support of an
affirmative position. He said, however, that he in no way had deviated from his
previous position of being willing for his government to engage in a meeting
with Bangla Desh representatives as was discussed on Nov. 2. (see paragraph 6
6. In answer to my question about his plans
therefore and the time table that he had envisioned, Yahya told me that on the
evening of Dec. 18 he would speak to the nation outlining certain salient
provisions of the constitution. These provisions would highlight the degree of
qte federated independence unqte which
7. Yahya then observed that, to him, it was obvious
that Mrs Gandhi and the members of her government were opposed to his plan for
a political solution of the present crisis, and to his efforts to regain that
degree of normalcy which would allow the refugees to return and resume their
normal lives. Noting that the
8. During the entire conversation it was obvious
that Yahya was preoccupied with the deteriorating law and order situation in
9. On a lighter and more optimistic vein, Yahya
advised me that he had received credentials from the New Indian high
Commissioner, J.K. Atal, and had turned the ceremonial occasion into what he
viewed as a constructive and salutary conversation: it had lasted for upwards
of two hours. He said that during the conversation, which at all times was
amiable and informative, he had found the viewpoints of the High Commissioner
to be well balanced, and that, to a degree, he appeared receptive of the
10. An opportunity arose whereby I floated the idea
of possible referendum in
referendum in
11. Before the conversation terminated, Yahya said
that during the last few days he had come up with an idea which, after a little
more thought, he might propose to U Thant or to Prince Sadruddin. The idea was
predicated upon the pressing need to repatriate the refugees and to
re-establich them in their homes and on their land. He said that what he was
thinking about involved a request to the United Nations to send to
12. Comment: I more and more have the impression
that Yahya believes he is being boxed in by the numerous pressures which are
being exerted upon him at home and abroad. It appears to me that Yahya sees his
political plan of action as his only means of extricating himself from an
untenable military and economic situation-a situation enflamed and fueled from
Indian sanctuaries and fully supported by the Indian Government. With a degree
of optimism, he thinks he is going to succeed in his endeavor, albeit the
apparatus he is using rings singularly hollow. Hollow or not, his plan might
possibly work as a means of transition, since a civilian government unbound by
the fetters of past MLA could bridge some of the political chasms which, to
Yahya, now seem impossible to bridge. In any event, war must be averted, I am
convinced that Yahya will not precipitate it unless provoked to desperation,
but I think it is altogether proper for me to report that I sensed in Yahya the
first signs of
agitation. GP-2
FARLAND, Unquote.
Source: The American
Papers – Secret and Confidential India.Pakistan.Bangladesh
Documents 1965-1973, University Press Limited, p.726 - 730