Secret Telegram          

November 6, 1971

From: Secretary State Washington DC

To: Ambassador New Delhi

 

Kaul-Irwin Meeting

 

Summary: Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul met with Under Secretary Irwin afternoon of November 5 for final roundup discussion on po­litical accommodation. Under Secretary reviewed with Kaul our most recent suggestions to Yahya for dialogue with cleared Awami Leaguers, Bangla Desh rep from India, and possible designation of such rep by Mujib. Kaul reiterated GOI's interest in dialogue be­tween rep designated by Mujib and one designated by Yahya, al­though expressing concern that such designation might not be freely made by Mujib as long as he continued to be under detention. Kaul expressed hope USG would pursue idea with GOP but stressed that idea should not be put forward as GOI's or as one which had formal GOI acceptance. Kaul expressed his frank personal view that release of Mujib and ultimate independence for Bangla Desh only solution which would be viable. End Summary.

 

1. Indian Fonsec T. N. Kaul, accompanied by Indian Embassy offi­cers Rasgotra and Verma, called on Under Secretary Irwin Novem­ber 5. Van Hollen, Schneider and Quainton present from NEA. Un­der Secretary began by expressing hope that thrice postponed bilat­eral talks could be rescheduled. Kaul responded that whenever time propitious for USG, US delegation would be most welcome. He thought it had been just as well to postpone talks until after PM's visit, since each side now had better appreciation of other's point of view.

 

2. Under Secretary asked Kaul for his assessment of how talks had gone. Kaul replied that they had been better than he had expected. He was glad to find that USG no longer tended to equate India and Pakistan and now saw situation in East Bengal as crux of matter. He also thought USG now recognized there was no use in trying to con­vert issue into Indo-Pak dispute and that both sides now agree that political accommodation had to be with Awami League and Mujib.

 

3. Turning to specific suggestions discussed with Primin, Kaul said GOI rather interested in proposal that nominee of Yahya and nomi­nee of Mujib start process of discussion for political settlement. Kaul asked, however, whether it would in fact be possible for anyone to have contact with Mujib or for him to designate representative as long as he was under detention. Kaul said that GOI did not exagger­ate USG's influence with GOP and hoped that we did not exaggerate GOI's with Bangla Desh leadership.

 

4. Under Secretary said he wished to review history of proposal so that both sides would be clear on what we are trying to do. He noted that original idea that Mujib designate someone to talk with West Pakistanis came from Keating-Jha conversation. Ambassador Farland then put idea to Yahya, who said he would consider this but did not say he would do it. We are prepared to go back to Farland and say the GOI now prepared to support idea under certain circumstances. Kaul interjected that he would not want us to go that far. GOI, he said, is not a party to dialogue and not in position to tell Bangla Desh Government what to do. If suggestion came from USG, it might lead to something provided it taken up urgently. Under Secretary re­sponded that we do not want to be in position for specific proposal. Rather, we wish to act as middleman or channel without substantive role. Kaul reiterated that it would not be fair to GOI at this stage since it could not speak for Bangla Desh. Under Secretary asked whether it would be fair to say that there was a proposition GOI con­sidered worth considering or which might be considered by Bangla Desh leadership. Kaul said GOI would have to ask them first. If it were to lead to release of Mujib and direct talks with him, it would be worth considering. Kaul expressed doubts that Mujib was suffi­ciently au fait since Awami League had declared independence. GOI, he said, could not take responsibility for Bangla Desh acceptance of our idea. He thought Bangla Desh leaders could not talk about any­thing except independence or release of Mujib.

 

5. Under Secretary noted that original suggestion made to Yahya was for Mujib to designate someone. It was not stated at that time that designee would actually see Mujib. It would be desirable but obvi­ously we had no assurance that it would be acceptable to Yahya. In our view, once dialogue began, numerous subjects might come up

which could not be accepted as preconditions. Kaul said that any dialogue must be between two people who could speak with author­ity and hence meeting between Mujib and designee was essential. Van Hollen noted that in agreeing to consider idea Yahya has gone beyond his previous positions. Under Secretary added that if India did not wish to be associated with idea, it would be helpful if we could say that we think there is possibility it might be acceptable to GOI or BDG. Kaul replied that it was not for GOI to accept or reject but for BDG alone. Under Secretary commented that GOI would have some influence with BDG as we have with Yahya. It very im­portant that GOI not oppose this idea. Kaul said GOI would not op­pose if acceptable to Bangla Desh leadership. He added that Yahya would "smell a rat" if GOI brought into discussion at this stage. Nonetheless, it would be worthwhile for USG to pursue with Yahya on its own. Van Hollen said that next step would be for US to con­sider whether we can ask Yahya for clarification of his idea.

 

6. Kaul, commenting on proposal, said that if it led to Mujib's re­lease, a real dialogue might be possible. Yahya seems to exclude everyone except Bangla Desh "Foreign Minister" Mushtaq. Kaul pointed out that Mushtaq has lost ground with his own government and that he is not the man for a dialogue. Van Hollen noted that Mushtaq would be acceptable under second formulation, i.e., dia­logue with Bangla Desh leader not accused of serious crimes. He wondered if anyone else might meet Yahya's criteria. Kaul said that no one in BDG could hold talks on anything less than independence. Only Mujib might do that and even he could be repudiated. It is now different situation from that before March 25, with many students and intellectuals now demanding independence. There is now con­sultative committee in which other parties involved. They would also have to be brought along. Kaul mentioned Kamal Hossain as some­one who might be Mujib's designee.

 

7. Kaul, quoting Primin, said that question to be decided was whether to save one man and his junta or the people of Pakistan and Bangla Desh. GOI fears that if there is not urgent political solution, there could be dissolution of West Pakistan, which GOI does not want. There were already simmering of trouble in Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP.

 

8. Under Secretary noted that President had spoken to Primin that it essential that confrontation of war be avoided, and how important this was from our view. Kaul said it was equally important for India. Problem was how to avoid it. Yahya has said that if freedom fighters succeed, he will attack. Under Secretary said this raised many sensi­tive and complex subjects which we had discussed in past, such as impact of insurgency on flow of refugees and on humanitarian food distribution. It also raised questions about support and training of guerillas. Kaul appealed to Under Secretary to understand political pressures under which GOI operates. He would then appreciate re­

straint which GOI had displayed. When Parliament convenes No­vember 15, pressures will increase and Primin will be charged with not having done enough. India does not wish to provoke confronta­tion, but if Pakistan makes freedom fighters' struggle an excuse for attack on India, we will reply. It is for international community to find political solution. Under Secretary responded that even if there is not political settlement we hope that there will not be war.

 

9. Kaul asked whether we had any time frame in view, since situation was very urgent. Under Secretary said we had none, but that we hoping that if dialogue began it would develop in such a way as to postpone confrontation. We recognized importance of time and the effect which the refugee flow was having on India's political, eco­nomic, and communal structure. Kaul said that if political settlement not found within several months that would be too late. If it were a question of several weeks there might be some hope. Kaul noted, for example, that once elections in East Pakistan completed and Assem­bly convened, negotiations would be completely out. How could one reconcile Yahya's intention to proceed with these political steps and his simultaneous offer of talks?

10. Under Secretary asked what Kaul had in mind when he said we must act before it is too late. India had said it would not attack but would retaliate. Suppose time goes on and Pakistan does not strike, even if insurgency relatively successful. Kaul said what he had in mind was that if resistance movement gained in tempo, there would be more repression and more refugees. India had reached the break­ing point. There are growing demands for recognition of Bangla Desh. India might then have to do it. Until now GOI had deliberately refrained from recognition, but once Parliament convened pressures would escalate. If something could be done before Parliament meets, Mrs. Gandhi's hand might be strengthened.

 

11. In conclusion, Kaul said that India had no desire to get into war with Pakistan. However, if there was war, it would not be like 1965 - - a stalemate. He said this not in spirit of bravado but as statement of fact. India does not want disunity of West Pakistan, but no one can prevent break-up of Pakistan. That is GOI assessment. The longer it is delayed, the greater the complications.

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 315 - 320