Department of State

 

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 722

STATE 2031 18

22

ORIGIN SS-07

INFO OCT-01 /008 R

66662

DRAFTED BY: EA/ACA : WABROWN

APPROVED BY: EA/ACA : WILLIAM A. BROWN

                                                                   ……..035772

R 060302Z NOV 71

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 203138

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC INFO DACCA, KARACHI, LAHORE, NEW DELHI NOV 4, 71 FROM ISLAMABAD IS REPTED TO YOU QUOTE

CONFIDENTIAL ISLAMABAD 10988

 

EXDIS

SUBJ          : BHUTTO'S PROJECTED TRIP TO THE PRC AND HIS DESIRE TO VISIT     

                  THE US

 

1. SUMMARY. PPP leader Bhotto met with me at his request. During the course of a lengthy meeting, he disclosed plans for him to proceed Nov. 5 with a GOP

delegation to Peking, and then sought my assistance in facilitating a subsequent meeting in Washington with President Nixon. END SUMMARY.

 

2. Late in the afternoon of Wednesday, Nov. 3, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought a QTE urgent meeting UNQTE with me. We arranged a meeting that evening at the

Islamabad Club, A/DCM accompanying me. Bhutto arrived about ten minutes late, apologetically explaining that he had been trying to dodge intelligence agents. Our meeting lasted one and one-half hours.

 

3. Prefacing his statement with the remark that he had much to say and wanted to come staright to the point, Bhutto opened our substantive conversation by

commenting that he had been adopting a position in his party council of emphasizing the desirability of strenthening relations with the U.S., and he said this was giving him some trouble within his party. I responded with some words of appreciation for

this.

 

4. He then commented on the extent to which the GOP is QTE down on the USSR UNQ'1'E. (In this respect he was echoing views and speculation in the local press, which commenced to appear after the August USSR-GOI agreement, and which most recently have centered on the GOP reaction to the communique issued at the conclusion of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin's visit to New Delhi.)

 

5. Bhutto, who said he had just returned the same morning from a brief trip abroad (Cairo, Paris, Rome), observed that he had two lengthy meetings with Sadat in Cairo. He spoke in very favorable terms of Sadat, and expressed the hope that Sadat's position would be strengthened, intimating that this would be in USG interests. In the latter connection, he emphasized that Sadat has come to be QTE fed up with the Soviets UNQTE.

 

6. He tole me that he had returned prematurely from his trip abroad, at the behest

of President Yahya, with whom he had conferred at length the same morning. He said that Yahya had proposed that he (Bhutto) go to Peking with a high-level delegation, including Gen. Hamid, Air Marshal Rahim, Rear Admiral Rashid, Foreign  - Secretary Sultan Khan, and others. He said that he had gone into the pros and cons of this proposal with Yahya, and had finally agreed to go. Bhutto claimed he would be regared as the head of the delegation, although he expressed this somewhat equivocally, explaining that QTE my name would be at the head of the list UNQTE. He said the group would leave Nov. 5.

 

7. Bhutto then came to what I regard as the nub of his conversation, and as the main reason for his regarding a meeting with me as QTE urgent UNQTE: noting that the Foreign Secretary would plan to go to Washington shortly after his return from Peking, he said he too would like to make a Washington visit. I asked whom he would like to see there, and he replied qte only President Nixon Unqte. He indicated that he would tentatively plan to go to Washington 10-15 days from now, and expressed the hope I could be helpful in arranging an audience with President Nixon. I showed sympathy for his desire to see the President, but was non-committal as to prospects. He stressed his having had meetings in the past with President Nixon prior to his becoming President, and spoke of his high regard for him. I remained non-committal, while continuing to show understanding for his objective.

 

8. I asked Bhutto what views he had on the advisability of GOP talks with Bangla Desh representatives. He said he would regard such talks as not only desirable but essential, as well as talks with Mujib, too. Bhutto observed that he is a politician, + and would look at such matters from the viewpoint of a politician. He went on to add that he would like also personally to go to New Delhi for talks with the GOI.

 

9. Showing considerable reticence in discussing GOP leaders, Bhutto finally identified Gen. Peerzada as the one who seemed to him to be keeping President Yahya at some distance from him (Bhutto). In response to an inquiry, he said that he does not RPT not believe that Peerzada's influence has measurably declined, despite some speculation to the contrary.

 

10. COMMENT: 1 find it difficult to recommend that Pres. Nixon meet with Bhutto at this juncture. Although Bhutto stands a good chance to obtain a position of considerable power and influence in the forthcoming civilian government, that

standing has yet to be achieved. On other hand, for reason that this chance patently exists and for obvious need to maintain as much rapport as possible with PPP leadership, if White House is negative on Bhutto's request, I think it would be appropriate for him to be received in the Department at the highest possible level assuming he would still make the trip. Incidentally, Bhutto commented that he intends use his influence while in Peking to promote USG-PRC detente. Advise soonest. Farland

Unquote ROGERS

 

 

Source:  The American Papers – Secret and Confidential India.Pakistan.Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973, University Press Limited, p.706-708