Secret Memorandum

November 2, 1971

Department of State

Washington DC

To: Mr. Christopher Van Hollen

From: Curtis F. Jones

 

SUBJECT: Indo-Pak Highlights, October 27 - November 2

 

No major military developments were observed during the week; the most significant developments of the period were the diplomatic moves by both governments and the growing involvement of the So­viets in the crisis.

 

Military

Most of the military moves reported reflected deployments previ­ously reported or anticipated, with the exception of the movement of the 14th Indian infantry division from Dehra Dun to Pathankot. Tank movements of regimental and larger units were seen in Delhi, and reports from both sides reflected a high degree of defensive prepara­tions underway, including mining of roads and bridges and construc­tion of bunkers and canals. Indian tanks were observed moving north of Udhampur toward Kashmir and infantry and armored units are re­ported to have deployed toward the border in southern Rajasthan near Barmer. Air violations are reportedly continuing on both sides. Civil defense measures in Calcutta have increased and restrictions on travel of foreigners in northeast India have been increased.

 

Political Moves

On November 1, the Indian Government announced for the first time that Indian "forces" had taken unspecified "counteraction" in re-

sponse to Pak artillery shelling along the Tripura border. In a possi­bly related move, the Indian Government announced that it had taken over administration of the state. Indian Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram sharpened his previous warnings by announcing that Indian forces have orders to drive back Pak forces well into Pakistan if they violate the border.

 

During her present tour, Mrs. Gandhi has stressed the urgency of the need for a rapid political accommodation in Pakistan and has implied that major Indian decisions -- including possible Indian intervention - - will be made on the basis of the results of her trip. So far, she ap­pears to have gained a measure of public and official sympathy in Brussels, Vienna and London, where each government has urged re­straint but now have offered tangible support or diplomatic initiative toward a solution.

 

In response to US urging for some gesture of moderation to provide Mrs. Gandhi during her Washington visit, President Yahya agreed to initiate unilaterally an unspecified degree of troop withdrawal from the border. Since Pakistan's defensive posture would not be seriously compromised by a limited pull-back of selected units, Yahya may actually implement a token withdrawal.

 

Soviet Moves

According to recent reports of the Firyubin visit, the Soviets are be­coming more heavily involved in both the political and military as­pects of the crisis. Firyubin reportedly advised the Indians to avoid a war if possible but, in the event of hostilities, to take their objectives as quickly as possible. According to a British report, Firyubin met with Bangla Desh leaders and pressed them to renounce their de­mand for independence; after renunciation, he said, Yahya would release Mujib and negotiate with the Awami League for the auton­omy of East Bengal.

 

Soviet Air Marshall Kutakhov will inspect Indian air defenses during his current visit. The nature and composition of high military team suggest that the Soviets may soon begin urgent deliveries of military equipment, possibly by airlift.

 

Assessment

With a state of low-level and undeclared -- but growing -- hostilities along the eastern border, and with a state of virtually full prepared­ness for large-scale hostilities on the western borders, both govern­ments appear to be concentrating their attention on last minute and perhaps final efforts to gain international support. In the past few weeks, each government has publicly established a record of griev­ances which could constitute a casus bell], and both have privately issued warnings which may be tantamount to unofficial ultimatums. Both governments appear to recognize that Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington could be a crucial watershed which will have an impor­tant -- possibly decisive -- influence on the events to follow.

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 304 - 306.