Secret telegram

14 October 1971

From: Amconsul Calcutta

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Sub: Contact with Bangladesh Reps

 

1. Summary: In absence from Calcutta of BD "Fonmin" Mushtaq Ahmed, Poloff met BD "High Commissioner" Hossain All late Oc­tober 12 and gave him substance reftel (A) (Paras 2, 3 and 4). Ali took careful notes during presentation and said he would pass Poloff's remarks to BD "Acting President" Nazrul Islam early Octo­ber 12 and, if latter deemed it desirable, would make special trip to report to Mushtaq. Ali wondered at utility of attempting to open dialogue with GOP, in light Yahya's October 12 broadcast speech, which he said contained no glimmer of hope for change in Pak atti­tude. Poloff urged that BDG give urgent and serious consideration to USG suggestions in interest of preserving lives of thousands of oth­ers who would surely be killed in potential war. Poloff argued that worst BDG could expect in dialogue was GOP refusal to talk, and suggested that this would be no worse than present BDG position. Ali seemed to take point and said he would report Poloffs remarks to leadership. End summary.

 

2. Poloff called Hossain Ali October 12 to request appointment with Mushtaq and was informed that Mushtaq out of Calcutta not ex­pected return until October 28 (except possibly briefly October 19). (Comment: Although Ali did not specify Mushtaq's whereabouts, we have impression from other sources that latter currently visiting Mukti Bahini training camps in and around Tripura. End comment.) In circumstances, and bearing in mind scheduled October 23 Awami League meeting, Poloff arranged to meet Ali evening October 12 to convey USG views as set forth paras 2, 3 and 4 reftel (A).

 

3. After Poloffs presentation, Ali asked Poloff repeat operative sen­tences and very carefully wrote down Poloffs exact words, e.g. "USG urges that BD rep seek earliest opportunity to present views directly to GOP in effort to explore possibility of negotiated settle­ment. USG hopes that both sides would meet without preconditions, prepared to discuses entire range of issues which face them. USG had informed Yahya it had established contact with Mushtaq and had discussed with him possibility of BDG-GOP meeting. Yahya had

expressed interest. USG is willing to assist in setting up such meet­ing lng by passing messages back and forth between two sides. How­ever, USG not rpt not willing to pass preconditions or demands from one side to another."

 

4. Ali inquired whether USG had passed to Yahya list of BDG "desires" given Poloff during September 23 meeting with Mushtaq. Poloff said not; Yahya had been informed of fact of contact between USG and BD reps, but not of substance. Ali said he wanted to make perfectly clear in his mind what USG was proposing to pass in way of messages because his definition of "messenger" was someone who would pass verbatim communications from one side to another with­out any changes in text and without comment. From Poloffs re­marks, he inferred that USG unwilling act as messenger in that sense of word, except for limited communications to enable BD and GOP reps to meet. Poloff replied that Ali correct. USG not interested in passing judgement on merits of positions of either side. It merely in­terested in helping arrange meeting between BD and GOP reps at which reps would discuss modalities, positions and demands, and hopefully arrive at agreed peaceful solution to current dispute. Ali responded that he personally could not see much value in USG playing such a role, but would nonetheless pass on proposal to BDG leadership. For instance, he was certain that BDG would take posi­tion that its representative at meeting with GOP would have to be Sheikh Mujib since no other leader would effectively speak for BD. Further, he doubted that anyone except Yahya would speak for GOP. He wondered why USG did not suggest to Yahya that he initiate talks with Mujib, since Sheikh readily at hand in West Pakistan.

 

5. Ali then asked if USG had any information on current status of Mujib. He noted that Calcutta daily Statesman October 12 had re­ported tribunal which trying Sheikh had recommended he be given death sentence. Poloff replied that he had no rpt no information on current status of Sheikh beyond what had appeared in press. He noted that USG had said publicly it had urged against execution Sheikh and that as far as we aware Sheikh still alive.

 

6. Ali said he had heard that Yahya expected to visit Tehran in near future and asked if there any significance to trip. Poloff responded that he believed Yahya's visit to Tehran would be ceremonial affair in context of 2500th anniversary of Persian Kingdom. Ali asked for date of Yahya visit and was told about October 15.

 

7. Ali said that despite Poloffs comments, he wondered at utility of attempting to arrange talks with Yahya. He showed Poloff copy of transcript of Yahya's October 12 broadcast to nation. He said he had just returned from discussion of speech with "Acting President" Is­lam, and they had agreed that speech showed Yahya still trying pull wool over world's eyes. They had seen no glimmer of hope for change in Yahya's remarks. Poloff suggested that it would be diffi­cult, if not impossible, for Yahya to take anything but hard line pub­licly. Ali said speech obviously meant for West Pak public con­sumption. He asked Poloff if USG thought Yahya had any idea ac­tual circumstances in East Pakistan. Poloff responded that he pre­sumed Yahya did and pointed to recent articles in West Pak press as indication that knowledge of actual conditions growing in West Pakistan. Ali said that relaxation of censorship in West Pak press would not necessarily imply knowledge on part of President. He said he suspected that Tikka Khan and, more recently, Governor Malik have been less than candid in their reports on situation to Yahya.

 

8. Ali said he would immediately inform Islam of Poloffs presenta­tion and that, if latter thought it useful, he would personally go at earliest opportunity to also inform Mushtaq. He thought Islam might wish to have presentation clarified by Poloff and asked if Poloff willing see Islam for this purpose. Poloff replied in affirmative. Ali said he had no idea what reaction of leadership would be, but said BDG position was that "total independence" and freedom of Sheikh Mujib were its only concerns.

 

9. Speaking personally, Ali noted that Mukti Bahini had worked hard to build itself up in past few months, was ready for battle and eager to fight for independence of BD. Poloff argued that continuation and escalation of violent method by MB might lead to death, destruction and suffering, which USG earnestly hoped could be avoided. It would be much better for BD to find peaceful solution to their prob­lems so that energies of MB could be more constructively channeled to rebuild in East. While Ali agreed that this might be more desirable solution, he said he was not sure in his own mind that it would be possible for simple reason he did not believe Yahya would peace­fully accord independence to BD. Poloff asked Ali what harm could come from effort to test GOP. He argued that even if Yahya refused to talk, BDG would be in no worse position than now.

 

10. Ali said in recent discussions among BD leadership they had talked about prospect of sub-continental war and had arrived at as­sumption that China is GOP's "best friend" and might assist GOP militarily. However, BDG leadership believed that because of recent Indo-Soviet treaty, Soviets could be counted upon to balance threat from Chinese. GOP was also calling USG one of its "best friends" but BDG read USG position differently and hoped US would remain neutral in event of heightened hostilities.

 

11. However, Ali said one factor which worried BDG was continu­ing US arms shipments to Pakistan. Poloff explained in some detail USG arms policy vis-a-vis India and Pakistan and argued that ship­ment of spare parts under licenses issued prior March 25 was of minimal importance to Pakistan militarily. Ali countered that (A) shipment of anything and (B) continuing publicity given to bureau­cratic attempts to keep military equipment moving in Pakistan, such as those recently revealed by Senator Kennedy, create bad public im­age for USG and make it highly suspect in eyes of BDG. He asked about precise makeup of recent spare parts shipments to Pakistan as well as precise valuation of spare parts shipments to India. Poloff said that such information was privileged on bilateral basis between governments involved. Ali said this secrecy led BDG leaders to believe USG could lie at anytime it chose. Moreover, if USG had de­cided that continuation of arming of Pakistan was in USG interests, it would continue to do so, while at same time making public denials of such efforts.

 

12. Poloff urged Ali not rpt not to be taken in by anti-US propa­ganda. He said USG, like any other large entity, was bound to make a few bureaucratic mistakes. However, policy had been publicly ar­ticulated for all to hear and USG was proud of its record of honesty in living up to its statements. He said that USG was deeply con­cerned about bringing an end to the violence and killing which could easily lead to greater conflagration in South Asia. Such policy was also in best interests of BDG and others in area. He urged Ali to work to convince BDG that it should take advantage of golden op­portunity to explore possibility of peaceful resolution of current ten­sions, again pointing out that death, destruction and suffering were already considerable and that alternative to peaceful solution was nothing but considerably more of same. Ali at this point seemed to give thoughtful consideration to Poloffs remarks.

 

13. Poloff told Ali USG did not wish to foreclose possibility of USG-BD reps contact in other localities. He specifically mentioned  possibility that USG and BD reps might encounter each other in New  York during UNGA. Nor, he said , did USG wish to put clamps on possibility of further meeting in New Delhi. Ali asked if he should instruct UN delegation to make attempt to meet USG reps and Poloff replied that this did not appear to be necessary because he assumed opportunities would naturally arise. At this point Poloff asked All di­rect question as to whether BDG had contact with representatives of other governments besides GOI, and Ali replied in negative.

 

Gordon

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971, p.259 – 263