Memorandum
of Conversation/1/
Washington, September
2, 1971.
/1/ Source:
National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 626, Country
Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Sep-Oct 1971. Secret;
Nodis. Drafted on September
8 by Constable (NEA/PAF).
SUBJECT
Military Supply Pipeline for Pakistan
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Christopher Van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
NEA
Peter D. Constable, Senior Political Officer, Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs
Maj. Gen. Inam-ul Haq,
Director General, Defense Procurement; Pakistan
Ministry of Defense
Mr. Z.M. Farooqi, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of
Pakistan
The
Secretary welcomed General Haq to Washington and expressed his deep
appreciation for President Yahya's prompt response to
Mr. Sisco's suggestion that our two governments look
at ways to deal with the remaining military supply pipeline. He also expressed
appreciation of President Yahya's understanding of
the problems that military supply pipeline presents. The Secretary stated,
however, that he wanted to make clear Mr. Sisco's
suggestion was just that. We are not pressing the Government of Pakistan. We
want to take a look at the problem together. We do not want to change our
policy toward Pakistan or to do anything that
will hurt Pakistan. If it does work out,
it would be to our mutual advantage, since it would give us an opportunity to
try to play a constructive role in economic assistance. Comparing the military
supply pipeline of $2.6 million with the economic assistance pipeline of $80
million, it is apparent which is the more important. While the military supply
question is not an important issue in domestic politics, Congressional
opposition to military supply has created a potential political problem in
U.S.-Pakistan relations. The pipeline question may impair our ability to be
helpful with economic assistance. It is in this context that Mr. Sisco asked Ambassador Hilaly if
shipments from the remaining small pipeline might be speeded up or items
ordered elsewhere. If that were done, then we could make a low-key statement to
the effect that shipments from the pipeline had been completed.
Major
General Haq replied by expressing President Yahya's deep appreciation for being taken into confidence.
He does not want to cause any difficulties for President Nixon and he is aware
of the political pressures. President Yahya had
instructed him to cooperate fully with us. There is tremendous good will in Pakistan for the United States and there might be some
bafflement when the public learns the United States is no longer shipping
military items to Pakistan. However, he hoped the
announcement can be worded in such a way as to avoid any impression that we
have joined hands with India. The General noted that
the recent Indo-Soviet treaty had caused an imbalance in the Subcontinent and
he alleged that the Indians would be receiving 400 T-60 series tanks from the
Soviets as a result of the treaty, while the Soviets had now cut off spares for
the inferior tanks they had previously supplied to Pakistan. It was obvious,
according to the General, that the new Soviet tanks
were for Indian use on the plains of the Punjab. The imbalance of power
could be increased by Pakistan's difficulties in
maintaining U.S. equipment, particularly
aircraft. He added, however, that they would try for the time being to find
alternate sources for the spares. He concluded by saying they would try to ship
out as much as possible in as short a time as possible. He also raised a
question as to the feasibility of air cargo shipments out by MATS flights, but
also recognized possible problems with this method.
The
Secretary then emphasized our interest in a low-key announcement, perhaps by
the State Department spokesman, noting simply that Pakistan had completed its
shipments of military supply items, or some similar formulation that we could
mutually agree on. The General and Mr. Farooqi
expressed their agreement with and appreciation for this kind of formulation.
Mr. Farooqi asked whether the resolution of the
military supply question would enable the United States to take the lead with
the Consortium countries in economic assistance questions. The Secretary
replied that it would make it easier. In response to Farooqi's
observation that President Yahya also hoped there
could be a resumption of arms shipments when conditions settled down, the
Secretary noted that while we need not go into that question now, relations
between the United States and Pakistan and their leaders were
very close and cordial.
(Note: In an
earlier conversation with the General, Mr. Van Hollen
sketched out briefly the mechanics of the "drying out" exercise as we
saw it, pointing out the need for rapid movement, if there were to be advantage
in an announcement before the Senate considered the foreign assistance
legislation. Subsequently in the technical discussions with General Haq, Mr. Constable pointed out that we were thinking in
terms of completion of shipments by the end of September.)
Source:
Document 139 , volume XI, South Asia crisis 1971, Department
of State.