Telegram
from the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/ Source:
National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted
by Constable (NEA/PAF) on August 25 and revised in the White House on August
30; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, and Atherton; and
approved for transmission by Eliot. Also sent to
159587.
Subject: Contacts with Bangla Desh
Reps. Ref:
/2/
Document 133.
/3/ Not found.
1. We agree
that President Yahya's reaction to Ambassador Farland's presentation of Bangla Desh rep's negotiation feeler is a "glimmer" of
hope. We do not, however, believe that the time has come for
2. The first
order of business should be for Ambassador Farland,
if he has no big problems, to inform President Yahya
of our ideas (outlined paras 3 and 4 below) and
without being an advocate, ask for his reaction. This approach should be
couched in terms of our willingness as a friend to help. It should be stressed
that we will not go any further in our contacts with Bangla
Desh reps than Yahya
desires.
3. Our
thinking is that it may be useful to further test temperature of water by
attempt at verification of Qaiyum's bona fides. We
see no better way to accomplish this quickly than to contact the Bangla Desh "Foreign
Minister" Mushtaq Ahmed directly in
4. We would
also inform Mushtaq Ahmed that Yahya
showed interest in a meeting of GOP reps and BD reps and volunteer to pass back
to President Yahya any response Mushtaq
may have. Should reactions from both sides to meeting prove favorable, we could
then examine question whether further
5.
Caveats-We are confident posts share Department's awareness need for utmost
caution and discretion in carrying out these next steps. Publicity concerning
possibility of direct contacts between GOP and BD
reps; exposure of our role; or knowledge of our contacts with Mushtaq Ahmed could cause sudden termination of this
exercise. Furthermore, we should all keep in mind at every step that what may
appear sincere desire to negotiate on one or both sides might in fact prove to
be little more than tactical maneuver in complex process of pursuing greater
influence over US policy. We will also need to bear in mind those who would
want to see negotiations fail. We presume such elements would exist in
6. For
Calcutta: If Ambassador Farland receives Yahya's approval, you should at earliest opportunity
contact BD Foreign Minister Mushtaq Ahmed with object
accomplishing purposes outlined in paras 3 and 4
above, at same time reiterating that we are passing messages but not acting as
mediator. If subject of visa for Mushtaq Ahmed
surfaces, you should follow
/4/
See footnote 5, Document 133.
7. For all
addressees: We will welcome continuing analysis and comments on: (a)
possibilities for negotiation between BD reps and GOP; (b) dynamics of possibly
troublesome divisions within BD movement (including Mukti
Bahini) over "independence vs.
accommodation"; (c) GOI attitudes toward negotiated settlement in lieu of
independent Bangla Desh;
(d) kind of settlement Yahya could sell in West
Pakistan to military and politicians; and (e) ways in which apparent BD
insistence on central role for Mujib (Calcutta 2204)
might be reconciled with Yahya's apparent need for
"secessionist scapegoat." Any other observations or contributions
would of course also be welcome./5/
/5/
Ambassador Farland endorsed the Department's scenario
and indicated that he would put it forward during his meeting with Yahya scheduled for September 4. He stated that he would
stress that
8. Messages
this subject should be transmitted Nodis.
Source:
Document 136, volume XI,