Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7,
Documents on
Released
by the Office of the Historian
Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Indian Foreign
Minister (Singh), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs (Sisco),
Kissinger: Now on the Indian who’s waiting; the basic
problem is to give him a combination of both sympathy, so that he can go home
with—to Mrs. Gandhi and—
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger:
—and great firmness.
Now I have, in addition to what you will say, but with Sisco there you won’t have much of a chance to. I’ve told Yahya that he had a personal
channel through me to you. I’m just
trying to keep them [the Indians] from attacking for 3 months. Now, if you could say that you are directing, that $60 million be made available for refugee
support after July 1.
Nixon: Do they know that yet?
Kissinger: No.
This is why it would be very helpful.
Nixon: Does Sisco
know?
Kissinger: No, but it’s based on a recommendation from
the State Department.
Nixon: That’s all right.
Kissinger: Out from the Embassy there. They’ll be delighted.
Nixon: Fifty thousand?
Kissinger: Yeah, and $20 million. You will see whether you can get $20 million
from other programs this month. Now,
they wanted to take it out of
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: But we can take a little from
Nixon: And that we are concerned.
Kissinger: Well, he’ll have a
story. And that we cannot—that you think
that overt pressure on
Nixon: I must say I am not too damned impressed with
Keating. I think he’s just gone overboard. Now I must say maybe there’s a hell of a
problem on which the TV is starting to pick it up now.
Kissinger: Oh, it is a hell of a problem.
[Omitted
here is a portion of the conversation unrelated to
Nixon: I don’t want to see [unclear, them start
war?] just now.
Kissinger: Because you saw harm on it from
Nixon: I know, but I don’t want to see it more. You see?
I just, they’re wasting my time. I just [unclear].
Kissinger: That really depends what we have to do. We have to keep them from attacking for our
own reasons.
[Pleasantries
were exchanged as Foreign Minister Swaran Singh,
Ambassadors Jha and Keating, and Assistant Secretary of
State Sisco entered the Oval Office. The White House
photographer was present at the beginning of the meeting.]
Singh: Our Prime Minister asked me to convey her
warmth and greetings. She greatly
appreciates your letter, the
Nixon: Sure. I appreciate
that. Tell her that we were all very
impressed by her great political victory out there. It gave her the stability that she, that she
needs now. It’s much, much better to look after a very successful election like
that. [unclear]
There’s a lot more to this. She has more
confidence than previously.
Singh: Yes [unclear]—
Nixon: Things are going well from
what Ambassador Keating tells me.
Singh: Yes, she has always had
confidence, but now she also has strength to—
Nixon: That’s right.
Singh: —put
them on [unclear]—
Nixon: Oh, I know.
I know.
Singh: And, in fact, she was looking for a period
when, as a result of this victory—
Nixon: Yeah.
Singh:
—she’d have both peace and opportunity to implement the socio-economic content
of the program on the basis of which she won.
Nixon: Uh-huh.
Singh: But suddenly she’s confronted with a—
Nixon: Yeah.
Singh:
—type of situation not of her making.
Nixon: Oh.
Yes.
Singh: Not to place blame here. . .
Nixon: Uh-huh.
Singh: . .
. [unclear] being subjected at this present moment.
Nixon: Uh-huh.
Singh: [unclear] and she wanted to, wanted me to
convey, Your Excellency, the latest situation, as the present one has no
[unclear] and we are coming and that every second [unclear, refugees they
come?]
Nixon: Every second?
Singh: Every second.
So this is the type of situation that we face. And this has caused a tremendous problem to
us, because they come in an area that traditionally is very dependent, both
politically and economically.
Nixon: Would you like some tea or coffee?
Singh: Thank you very much.
Nixon: [aside] Ken?
Singh: I’m all right.
Nixon: [aside; whispering] Some
tea perhaps, please. Thank you.
Singh: [unclear]
Nixon: No, I can’t.
Singh: Politically, economically adept. And if another six million people are ready
to come in a state of anger, frustration, and destitute, that adds to the
[unclear] ability and the social-economic tension that all of them have
created. [unclear] We’ve reduced any financial [unclear]. In this situation, that we seek your advice
how we should achieve that objective.
But perhaps most important thing in that situation [unclear] will use
this movement of refugees which always [unclear]. Technically, on this issue, we gave a clear
[unclear, signal?]. We [unclear] the
objective will be [unclear]. In this
situation where we [unclear] many field commanders that we called feel it’s their own problem. It
ceases to be an internal problem and it should affect [unclear] tension
[unclear]. And it’s the best end right
now that we’ve got. Support for this
approach of ours and help with [unclear].
How to meet this objective, we believe that if the building of the
[unclear] can be seen [unclear] make up their minds. [unclear] can be
sure as he can be [unclear] security take [unclear].
Nixon: Hmmm.
Singh: And secondly, then, the condition that they
are to be restored should enable you to return that. In the statements we are prepared to take, we
must perhaps create this. [unclear] And for
this, obviously some political settlement is needed. You mentioned in your letter to the Prime
Minister you are engaged in this task in your quiet manner and tried to impress
on them what you have done. We believe
that the return from [unclear] is possibility if the military actions of trying
to solve a situation [unclear].
Apparently those people who have now demonstrated [unclear] that they
enjoy the confidence of the people [unclear].
In the long range there are really two guys [unclear]. This will be a situation in which [unclear].
Nixon: What do you think is the, what do you think
is the benefit of [unclear] being able to—East Pakistan will to have to become
independent, or what happens in the long run?
This does not mean that your personal view, I know—that’s not what I
meant. How do you see the historical
process working down there?
Singh: I have a feeling, Mr. President, that
showing, telling the United Nations that there’s a very good chance of saving
Pakistan and [unclear]. [unclear] maintain central authority in an area of
confrontation of the [unclear] can they handle central authority?
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Singh: [unclear] There’s a very good chance to
have. Even the course of the
negotiations, with all that we know, would even the Awami [unclear] more than
contained in their six-point program in the direction. [unclear] without
direction of this nature, and we have authority to create [unclear], so it
could be saved. The Council has become
most angered because they [unclear]. The
confidence has been very rudely shaken. When the military rulers in
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Singh: [unclear] Then it
appears that they’re pushing them more and more into the point of, the position
of the point of no return. And it
appears [unclear]. They must. We have an opposition quite clearly; it’s developed
between the central authority of
Nixon: You don’t, you don’t have a feeling that the
situation would be to your interest to have a, to have an independent
country? What would be in
Singh: No, we have—we have no fixed position on
that.
Nixon: That’s up to them, isn’t it?
Singh: On this matter we leave it up to the
Pakistanis and the leaders of the Awami League to decide about their future in
any manner they like. We will not press
one or the other solution, or [unclear] to it.
We are interested in observing the neutrality in [unclear] considering
the situation.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Singh: That being our fixed position.
Nixon: Yeah.
Yeah.
Singh: [unclear] silent spectators all [unclear]
agreeing with what, to our arrangement to [unclear] the people and until then,
it seems to me, there will be unstable conditions, at least.
Nixon: Yes.
Singh: And we are conscious of our responsibility
and even when we were facing this big trouble in the end with these people when
we [unclear] did our best. [unclear] All
provisions are to be clear which were settled by [unclear] extra-constitutional
means. [unclear]
Nixon: Sure.
First let me say that we, that you couldn’t have a man more [unclear] in
so far as bringing this matter to our attention, than your own Ambassador
here. He’s talked to our people and he’s
a very persuasive man and has let us know what the position is. And, of course, he has—we have great respect
for him. And on our part we couldn’t
have a person who is more vigorous in presenting this point of view which you
have described. Of course, you would
describe it in a more precise way than, which you naturally can in your
position. It’s obvious that Ambassador
Keating, of course you know an old friend of mine in the House and Senate. He lives here. We had a long talk yesterday. We went over all these matters.
Singh: [unclear]
Nixon: He is, he is just—he is concerned as your
Ambassador, and of course we’re aware of this.
So I am keenly aware of the problem.
I’m aware, too, of the enormous agony that must be caused—I have not
been,
Singh: We count six, Mr. President.
Nixon: Six million. Yeah, that’s right.
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: One every second, that’s 60 every minute.
Singh: [unclear]?
Nixon: [unclear] That’s
over 600 an hour.
Singh: [unclear]
Nixon: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Now the, the—I am sure you realize, too, that
what we can do, you know, what we feel is one thing; what we can do is another. We have the deepest sympathy and we will try
to do as much as we can. We don’t want
to do anything that would be, that has the opposite results from what we want,
you know. Naturally, our—with regard to
the Government of Pakistan, we of course have our contacts with them, our relations
with them, with the President, of course.
It’s terrible. The question is
how we can discuss this matter with them in a way that will maybe, may bring
about action that would lead to amelioration of the situation. Or how we, or—and avoiding [unclear, the woodshed?]
might set up, as often is the case when such things are done too publicly,
which would set up an antagonistic attitude.
I’m not speaking personally from the standpoint of those who would look
for something to be antagonistic about. That
might just upset it all. We, I would
like to say this: that we, I think that under best course of action—I’d like to
talk first of all what would we need your advice with regard to what we can do
with the meeting situation—the best course of action we think as a Government
is for us to, is for you to have confidence, and I want you to convey this to
the Prime Minister, on a completely off-the-record basis. Discussions that are publicly talked about
would have exactly the opposite effect on that.
You’ve got to, you must have confidence that one, I am acutely aware of
the problem. I am deeply concerned about
the problem for humanitarian [unclear, reasons?] and I am concerned about it
for its foreign policy implications, for all this could erupt into some armed
conflict. We know that. Now—therefore, we, I will use all the
persuasive methods that I can, but I must use them in the way that I think is
the most effective, in a way perhaps that, say, she might never use, in a way
that any nation would want used when we talk with their leader and so
forth. But I am aware of the problem, I
shall try to use my influence as effectively as possible at least if
effectively means not using it in a public, blunt way. And I [unclear] such and such is, had
been. Not only has our concern been
expressed but that you will have this in mind in future discussions that we
have that we have to do it this way. And
that has to be answered. The second
thing is, of course, looking at the immediate problem that you need more funds;
the Ambassador has discussed with us the various options that we have. We have
an immediate problem between now and July 1st, and it’s just for
here [unclear, ’til then?] And,
but on the other hand, but because, you know, we’ve run out of money because
it’s all been spent with only 15 days left.
On the other hand we have out of other aid programs that won’t need any
[unclear] because that would cause problems for where they came from. But we have been able to acquire $20 million
that we will, we will find immediately available. And then in addition to that, on the July, on
July 1st, we will be able to apply $50 million, so which will give
you a total of $70 million to relieve them, the aid problem. We’d give you
more, but that’s, that’s as much as we can find. You see, we have to take from
various other commitments that have been made. So you get $20 million between
now and the first of July, $50 million more on the first of July or just as
soon as the fiscal year begins.
Keating: Yes.
Nixon: And that your Government can
count on. Is that correct, roughly speaking, or is the 20—?
Kissinger: The difference is that we had to piece
together the $20 million, Mr. President, out of other programs.
Nixon: Right. The point is we’ll find the $20 million.
You can count on it. The $50 million—
Kissinger: That’s right.
Sisco: We’ve got that.
Kissinger: Including the lowest parts of your
supplemental appropriations
Nixon: Right.
And we’ve got to look down towards that, but on the other hand, I’m
aware of the fact that this will take care of how many? Six million people. For how long? Not long.
It’ll help. On the other hand, I
realize that that does not get at the long-range problem. The long-range problem is how do we stop this
inflow of people? How—maybe you’d start
having them turn around, start outflowing them. That’s what we’re getting at. I think you, you first, you brought it to my
attention when you met me. The Prime
Minister and you heard this conversation with our Ambassador, Ambassador
Keating. All brought it to my attention
and I’m convinced of the seriousness of the problem. I will, I will try to find the methods that I
think will be effective. I think it will
protect [unclear] can’t do that. [unclear] effective.
There may be other ways for this to be effective. But I think we have
to, I think it must not be in a way that appears that we’re, that
what has happened here is that the
Singh: We greatly appreciate your sentiment and
[unclear] in coming to a concrete conclusion in a short time. [unclear] This is an
international responsibility. [unclear] We
appreciate it, yes. [unclear]. You yourself mentioned it. [unclear] The question, one, how to
stop it, and how to create conditions [unclear].
Nixon: This is the fundamental question now.
Singh: This is the fundamental question. [unclear]
Nixon: I know.
I am aware of that. I am aware of
the, I am aware of the fact that the funds, while essential, [deal] with a
temporary problem do not handle—I am not suggesting at all, or have any
illusions, that if we found $700 million to put into this thing that would
simply buy the problem away. The problem
is going to go away only as the deeper causes are resolved. And I am aware of that. How we get at those deeper causes is a very
sensitive problem as you well know, and the Foreign Minister has to be highly
sensitive to how people feel and approach us and so forth. And how other governments
may feel about this, how they react.
One way the public pressure, another way the private, shall we say persuasion. I have
always believed in the latter myself as the most effective way, particularly
when I know the individuals fairly well.
Singh: That we are agreed. Perhaps the whole problem can be divided into
two parts. There are some aspects, which could [unclear].
Nixon: We will then proceed on that basis . I don’t think anything, however, certainly at this
point, would be served by any indication of the
Singh: The German money, I honestly—
Nixon: How about the French?
Sisco: I looked at a figure today, Mr. President, I
think the Germans are somewhere around two million, and the French are
something a little less than that.
Nixon: That’s not enough.
Sisco: That’s not enough.
Nixon: All right, that’s not enough. The French and Germans have just as great an
interest as we have. Here they are
making all sorts of big statements and doing very little. Now, you head over to the French and Germans
and their colleagues formally, that clear?
The same with the low countries that talk big
and don’t help much. I have no sympathy
for them. [unclear]
made a statement when he was here. The
Germans can afford—if we can afford $70 million, the Germans can afford 10,
easy—or 15.
Kissinger: We’ve already given 17.5.
Nixon: That’s right.
We’ll, we’ve put in 100 so the Germans should put in 25. That’s the way it ought to be. Because you know, we don’t believe in this
office of talking big and doing little.